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	EU	citizens’	rights	post	Brexit:	why	direct	effect	beyond	the	EU	is	not	
enough	
	
(forthcoming	in	European	Constitutional	Law	Review	2018)	
	
Stijn	Smismans∗	
	
Brexit	–	EU	citizens’	rights	–	direct	effect	beyond	the	EU	–	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	does	not	protect	citizens	properly	–	copying	substantive	provisions	
of	EU	law	and	parts	of	the	EU’s	supranational	features,	such	as	direct	effect,	does	
not	provide	equal	protection	for	EU	citizens	once	a	country	is	no	longer	part	of	
the	EU	–	UK-specific	implementation	measures	to	be	set	out	in	Withdrawal	
Agreement	or	Protocol	-	guarantees	also	to	be	set	out	in	primary	legislation	–	the	
UK	Government	intends	to	act	to	a	great	extent	via	secondary	legislation	–	the	
relationship	between	the	Withdrawal	Act	and	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	and	
Implementation	Bill.		
	
	
	
INTRODUCTION	
	
One	of	the	key	priorities	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	has	been	the	protection	of	the	
3.5	million	EU	citizens	already	residing	in	the	UK	and	the	more	than	1	million	
British	citizens	residing	in	the	EU.		Much	of	the	debate	has	focused	on	the	
material	scope	of	the	rights	they	will	hold	after	Brexit.		The	draft	Withdrawal	
Agreement1	provides	for	a	status	that	would	come	close	to	their	current	status,	
although	these	citizens	would	be	deprived	of	some	of	the	rights	they	currently	
hold,	in	particular	in	relation	to	family	reunion	and	the	increased	risk	of	being	
deported	on	the	basis	of	criminality	for	acts	committed	after	Brexit,	while	the	
free	movement	rights	of	British	citizens	residing	in	the	EU	are	only	guaranteed	in	
the	country	in	which	they	are	currently	residing.		The	main	challenge,	however,	
remains	in	ensuring	that	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	and	British	citizens	in	the	EU	can	
have	access	to	this	new	status;	as	well	as	guaranteeing	proper	implementation	of	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		This	challenge	is	especially	difficult	for	EU	citizens	
in	the	UK,	as	the	country	will	no	longer	be	part	of	the	EU,	and	will	thus	fall	out	of	
the	comprehensive	judicial	protection	provided	by	EU	law.		Therefore,	this	
article	focuses	on	the	legal	status	of	EU	citizens	in	the	UK,	rather	than	that	of	the	
British	citizens	in	the	EU.	In	particular,	it	will	analyse	the	procedural	
mechanisms	needed	to	guarantee	their	rights,		rather	than	debate	the	material	
scope	of	their	status.2		
																																																								
∗	Professor	of	EU	law	and	Director	of	the	Centre	for	European	Law	and	Governance	at	Cardiff	
University.		I	would	like	to	thank	Monique	Hawkins,	Luke	Piper,	Laurent	Pech,	Joelle	Grogan	and	
three	anonymous	reviewers	for	useful	comments	on	an	earlier	version	of	this	paper.		
1	Draft	Agreement	on	the	withdrawal	of	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	
Ireland	from	the	European	Union	and	the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	highlighting	the	
progress	made	(coloured	version)	in	the	negotiation	round	with	the	UK	of	16-19	March	2018,	
TF50	(2018)	35	–	Commission	to	EU27,	19	March	2018.	
2	In	this	article	I	do	not	address	the	concept	of	EU	citizenship.		Surprisingly,	the	conceptual	
debate	on	EU	citizenship	in	the	context	of	Brexit	has	particularly	focused	on	the	idea	of	‘associate	
Anxiety	about	the	fate	of	the	3.5	million	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	has	increased	in	
the	light	of	the	UK’s	approach	to	immigration,	which	is	both	draconian	and	
notorious	for	a	high	implementation	error	rate	by	the	Home	Office	(Ministry	of	
internal	affairs).			In	April	2018,	the	then	Home	Secretary	(Minister	of	internal	
affairs)	Amber	Rudd	resigned	as	a	consequence	of	the	‘Windrush’	scandal,3	
which	brought	to	light	how	people	from	Caribbean	origin,	who	had	lived	legally	
in	the	UK	for	decades,	were	suddenly	deprived	of	all	entitlements,	detained	and	
sometimes	deported,	because	their	legal	entry	into	the	country	decades	earlier	
was	suddenly	contested.			Such	treatment	is	not	unique	to	the	Windrush	
generation,	and	it	is	easy	to	see	the	parallels	with	the	position	EU	citizens	might	
find	themselves	in	after	Brexit	as	they	were	never	asked	for	any	proof	of	their	
status	until	now.	
It	is	no	surprise	then	that	the	EU	has	sought	to	ensure	that	EU	citizens	would	still	
be	able	to	profit	from	a	certain	level	of	‘supranational	protection’	after	Brexit.		
Indeed,	the	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	states	that	its	section	on	citizens’	rights	
will	have	direct	effect	in	the	UK,	and	the	preliminary	rulings	procedure	should	
remain	available	for	8	years	after	Brexit.			From	an	international	law	and	national	
sovereignty	perspective,	this	supranational	protection	appears	extraordinary.		
Never	have	these	supranational	features	of	EU	law	reached	beyond	the	EU.		
However,	it	would	be	wrong	to	assume	that	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	now	have	
extraordinary	protection.		Beside	the	fact	that	the	promised	‘settled	status’	is	
inferior	to	the	rights	they	currently	enjoy,	the	main	problem	is	that	many	remain	
at	risk	of	failing	to	prove	entitlement	to	this	status,	while	tools	for	monitoring	
and	enforcement	are	weak.			In	this	article	I	argue	that	the	EU,	and	in	particular	
the	European	Commission,	has	been	too	complacent	and	has	taken	a	formalistic	
approach	to	the	negotiations,	ignoring	the	particular	challenges	of	
implementation	in	the	UK	as	a	country	outside	of	the	EU.		The	EU’s	approach	to	
citizens’	rights	in	the	withdrawal	negotiations	is	based	on	a	double	flaw.			It	takes	
a	cut-and-paste	approach	to,	respectively,	EU	supranational	principles	(such	as	
direct	effect)	and	substantive	EU	law	provisions	(such	as	the	Citizens’	Directive	
2004/38/EC),	and	pretends	that	the	literal	transfer	of	these	principles	and	
provisions	would	offer	the	same	level	of	protection	to	EU	citizens	even	in	a	
country	that	will	no	longer	be	a	member	of	the	EU.		Unfortunately	this	fails	to	
take	into	account	the	particular	challenges	EU	citizens	face	in	the	UK,	which	is	
due	both	to	the	legacy	of	how	the	UK	has	dealt	with	EU	immigration	in	the	past	
and	to	the	limitations	of	EU	oversight	when	the	UK	is	out	of	the	EU.		As	a	result,	
																																																																																																																																																														
citizenship’,	promoted	by	Guy	Verhofstadt,	which	would	guarantee	EU	citizenship	rights	for	
British	nationals	even	if	not	yet	residing	in	the	EU.		On	the	profound	conceptual	and	legal	
problems	of	that	proposal,	see	M.	van	den	Brink	and	D.	Kochenov,		‘A	critical	perspective	on	
associate	EU	citizenship	after	Brexit’,	DCU	Brexit	Institute	Working	Paper	(2018)	No.5;	at	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175318.		For	other	interesting	
contributions	on	EU	citizenship	post-Brexit	see	P.	Mindus	(2017),	European	citizenship	after	
Brexit	(Palgrave	2017);	and	S.	Reynolds,	‘(De)constructing	the	road	to	Brexit:	Paving	the	way	to	
further	limitations	to	the	free	movement	and	equal	treatment?’,	in	Daniel	Thym	(ed),Questioning	
EU	Citizenship:	Judges	and	the	Limits	of	Free	Movement	and	Solidarity	in	the	EU’,	(Hart	2017),	p.57.		
While	much	remains	to	be	said	on	EU	citizenship	conceptually	in	the	light	of	recent	
developments,	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	identifying	the	procedural	mechanisms	needed	to	
protect	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	properly.	
3	The	Week,	‘Who	are	the	Windrush	Generation	and	how	has	the	scandal	unfolded’,	available	at	
http://www.theweek.co.uk/92944/who-are-the-windrush-generation-and-why-are-they-facing-
deportation.	
and	despite	the	‘extraordinary’	reference	to	direct	effect	and	preliminary	rulings,	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement	leaves	EU	citizens	in	a	very	vulnerable	position.		
	
In	the	first	section	I	analyse	the	key	substantive	flaw	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement,	which	consists	in		copying	into	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	the	same	
level	of	discretion	for	implementation	that	is	built	into	the	Citizens	Directive	
2004/38/EC.		While	such	discretion	may	be	appropriate	for	Member	States	
within	the	EU,	it	has	very	different	consequences	when	a	country	is	no	longer	
part	of	the	EU.		The	combination	of	introducing	a	constitutive	instead	of	
declaratory	registration	system,	the	UK’s	‘hostile	environment’	immigration	
policy	and	the	weak	supranational	guarantees	when	out	of	the	EU,	means	that	
many	EU	citizens	risk	immediate	loss	of	all	entitlements	to	work,	healthcare,	
benefits,	and	ultimately	face	deportation.			I	argue	that	the	only	way	to	guarantee	
this	does	not	happen	is	by	setting	out	a	detailed	procedure	within	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement,	or	in	a	separate	Protocol	attached	to	it,	on	how	the	UK	
will	organise	the	registration	of	EU	citizens.		
In	section	2,	I	analyse	the	main	procedural	flaw	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	
namely	the	assumption	that	a	simple	requirement	to	apply	direct	effect	to	
citizens’	rights	would	provide	sufficient	protection	for	EU	citizens	to	retain	their	
current	status.			I	will	first	analyse	the	procedural	implementation	mechanisms	
described	in	the	Joint	Report.	The	Joint	Report	was	adopted	by	the	UK	and	the	EU	
in	December	2017	to	set	out	the	political	agreement	on	what	would	be	written	in	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		The	Joint	Report	seems	to	take	into	account	the	
particular	challenges	of	implementation	in	a	non-EU	country	by	suggesting	a	
double	guarantee,	namely	direct	effect	and	the	full	incorporation	of	citizens’	
rights	into	primary	legislation.		However,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	less	
detailed	regarding	how	the	UK	should	implement	the	Agreement.		It	appears	to	
assume	that	by	simply	copying	the	principle	of	direct	effect,	EU	citizens	would	be	
properly	protected.	However,	this	underestimates	the	difficulties	of	
implementing	the	supranational	features	of	EU	law	in	a	non-EU	country.		I	will	
argue	why	such	a	double	guarantee,	namely	direct	effect	and	citizens’	rights	
provisions	in	primary	legislation,	is	indeed	highly	desirable.		
Having	analysed	the	two	main	flaws	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	in	the	final	
section	I	will	analyse	how	this	interacts	with	the	legal	framework	the	UK	is	
setting	up	to	take	itself	out	of	the	EU	and	implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	
in	particular	in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	citizens’	rights.	This	framework	
is	constituted	of	the	European	Union	Withdrawal	Act	(by	which	the	UK	takes	
itself	out	of	the	EU,	but	retains	existing	EU	law	until	revision	by	future	UK	law)	
(further	referred	to	as	Withdrawal	Act),4	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	and	
Implementation	Bill	(further	referred	to	as	Implementation	Bill),	and	the	
proposed	registration	system	(as	set	out	in	the	Statement	of	Intent	regarding	the	
EU	Settlement	Scheme).5		The	proposed	legal	framework	suggests	the	
Government	will	have	considerable	leeway	to	implement	EU	citizens’	rights.		In	
the	absence	of	proper	supranational	protection	and	clear	guarantees	set	out	in	
primary	legislation,	the	residence	status	of	many	EU	citizens	is	at	risk,	
																																																								
4	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Act	2018	c.16,	26.06.2018.		
5	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	of	Intent,	21.06.2018.	
particularly	when	also	taking	into	account	the	substantive	flaw	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement.				
I	conclude	that	the	EU	should	set	aside	its	formalistic	approach,	and	
acknowledge	that	copying	parts	of	the	EU’s	supranational	principles	such	as	
direct	effect	and	substantive	provisions	of	EU	law	is	not	the	same	as	maintaining	
the	current	protection	of	EU	citizens.		Unlike	what	may	appear	at	first	sight,	the	
inclusion	of	direct	effect	and	preliminary	reference	procedure	in	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	does	not	provide	‘extraordinary’	protection	to	EU	citizens.		It	is	not	
extraordinary	as	there	are	serious	limits	to	the	‘supranationality’	provided;	and	
it	is	definitely	not	extraordinary	in	guaranteeing	that	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	will	
not	be	deprived	of	their	current	rights.		In	order	to	avoid	the	latter,	the	EU	should	
take	into	account	the	particular	features	of	the	UK	legal	system	as	a	country	no	
longer	part	of	the	EU,	and	adjust	guarantees	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	
accordingly.		This	can	be	done	by	adopting	a	separate	Protocol	attached	to	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	in	which	the	UK	would	set	out	its	registration	system	
(thereby	overcoming	the	risk	of	the	discretion	provided	by	the	Citizens’	
Directive),	and	by	including	into	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	a	clear	requirement	
to	set	out	into	primary	legislation	not	only	the	principle	of	direct	effect	but	also	
the	substantive	citizens’	rights	provisions.		
	
THE	SUBSTANTIVE	FLAW	OF	THE	WITHDRAWAL	AGREEMENT	
	
Why	copy-and-paste	is	not	the	same	as	maintaining	current	protection	
	
The	Withdrawal	Agreement	copies	most	of	the	substantive	rights	provided	by	
the	EU	Citizens’	Directive	2004/38/EC,6	the	professional	qualifications	Directive7	
and	the	free	movement	of	workers	and	social	security	Regulations.8	EU	citizens	
in	the	UK	would	thus	be	able	to	rely	on	most	of	these	rights	of	residence,	and	
non-discrimination	against	nationals	in	relation	to	the	right	to	work,	providing	
services,	access	to	healthcare	and	benefits.		Some	rights	were	strongly	disputed	
in	the	negotiations	and	the	public	debate;	and	EU	citizens	have	to	give	up	some	
of	their	rights	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		E.g.	under	EU	law,	an	EU	citizen	has	
more	rights	than	a	British	citizen	to	bring	in	a	third	country	spouse,	which	was	
unacceptable	for	the	British	negotiators.		Another	problem	was	the	right	to	
return	to	the	UK.		Under	EU	law,	a	citizen	can	lose	their	permanent	residence	
after	two	years	of	absence,	but	can	still	rely	on	EU	free	movement	rules	to	return.		
																																																								
6		Directive	2004/38/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	29	April	2004	on	the	
right	of	citizens	of	the	Union	and	their	family	members	to	move	and	reside	freely	within	the	
territory	of	the	Member	States	amending	Regulation	(EEC)	No	1612/68	and	repealing	Directives	
64/221/EEC,	68/360/EEC,	72/194/EEC,	73/148/EEC,	75/34/EEC,	75/35/EEC,	90/364/EEC,	
90/365/EEC	and	93/96/EEC	(OJ	L	158,	30.4.2004,	p.	77).	
7	Directive	2005/36/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	7	September	2005	on	
the	recognition	of	professional	qualifications	(OJ	L	255,	30.9.2005,	p.	22).	
8	Regulation	(EU)	No	492/2011	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	5	April	2011	on	
freedom	of	movement	for	workers	within	the	Union	(OJ	L	141,	27.5.2011,	p.	1).		Regulation	(EC)	
No	883/2004	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	29	April	2004	on	the	coordination	
of	social	security	systems	(OJ	L166,30.4.2004,p.1);	and	Regulation	(EC)	No	987/2009	of	the	
European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	16	September	2009	laying	down	the	procedure	for	
implementing	Regulation	(EC)	No	883/2004	on	the	coordination	of	social	security	systems	(OJ	
L284,	30.10.2009,	p.1).	
After	Brexit,	the	latter	option	would	fall	away;	unless	EU	citizens	were	given	an	
unconditional	right	to	return.		The	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	settled	for	a	
compromise	for	a	right	to	return	for	five	years.		Most	problematically,	the	EU	has	
accepted	that	the	UK	can	deport	even	those	with	permanent	residence	for	
criminal	conduct	after	Brexit.		Rather	than	sticking	to	the	restrictive	grounds	of	
deportation	set	out	in	the	Citizens’	Directive,	the	UK	will	be	allowed	to	set	out	its	
own	definition	of	criminal	conduct	liable	to	deportation.		
All	these	topics,	in	which	the	material	scope	of	the	new	status	would	differ	from	
that	of	the	Citizens’	Directive,	have	attracted	strong	debate	and	the	European	
Parliament	in	particular	is	still	set	to	fight	for	ensuring	all	these	rights	to	the	full.		
This	is	laudable	from	the	perspective	that	these	citizens	have	built	up	their	life	in	
the	legitimate	expectation	that	they	were	protected	by	EU	citizenship,	and	there	
is	much	to	be	said	for	considering	these	rights	as	acquired	rights.9			
At	the	same	time,	the	focus	in	the	negotiations	on	the	material	scope	of	the	new	
status	-	called	‘settled	status’	in	the	UK,	although	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	uses	
the	concept	‘permanent	residence’	-10	has	overshadowed	discussion	on	who	can	
obtain	this	status,	and	how	they	can	do	so.		
The	EU	has	taken	a	formalistic	approach	and	simply	copied	the	personal	scope	
and	burden	of	proof	requirements	set	out	in	the	Citizens’	Directive,	assuming	
this	would	guarantee	EU	citizens	the	same	rights	as	they	hold	now.	
Unfortunately,	this	fails	to	take	into	account	the	particular	challenges	of	applying	
these	criteria	in	the	UK	once	it	is	no	longer	part	of	the	EU.		
		
In	a	nutshell,	in	order	to	obtain	the	residence	rights	provided	by	the	EU	Citizens’	
Directive,	one	needs	to	be	in	work	(or	have	been	in	work),	or	demonstrate	
having	sufficient	resources	and	comprehensive	sickness	insurance.			There	is	a	
level	of	discretion	for	the	Member	States	on	whether	and	to	what	extent	they	
impose	and	control	these	criteria.		One	can	discuss	whether	the	system	set	up	by	
the	Directive	provides	the	best	balance	between	facilitating	free	movement	(and	
protecting	those	who	made	use	of	it)	and	allowing	Member	States	some	scope	to	
impose	restrictions	in	order	to	ensure	viability	of	their	welfare	system.	It	is	not	
the	place	here	to	repeat	that	debate.	11	Rather,	while	assuming	the	system	
																																																								
9	The	concept	of	‘acquired	rights’	as	traditionally	used	in	international	law	has	limited	scope	to	
protect	all	the	rights	provided	by	EU	citizenship.		See	House	of	Lords,	European	Union	
Committee,	‘Brexit:	Acquired	Rights’,	10th	report	of	session	2016-17,	HL	Paper	82,	14	December	
2016.	Yet,	in	a	report	for	the	European	Parliament,	Volker	Roeben	et	al.	develop	the	argument	of	
‘continuity’	on	the	basis	of	EU	citizenship.	See	V.	Roeben,	J.	Snell,	P.	Minnerop,	P.	Telles	and	K.	
Bush	QC,	The	feasibility	of	associate	EU	citizenship	for	UK	citizens	post-Brexit,	A	study	for	Jill	Evans	
MEP,	July	2017.	I	do	not	agree	with	the	authors	that	such	continuity	is	possible	for	those	who	
have	never	exercised	the	free	movement	rights,	but	the	argument	merits	elaboration	for	those	
who	have;	which	is,	though,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
10	Throughout	the	negotiations	the	EU	has	always	referred	to	its	existing	concept	of	‘permanent	
residence’,	while	the	UK	negotiators	used	the	concept	of	‘settled	status’	instead,	which	is	also	the	
concept	used	in	the	Government’s	proposal	on	how	it	will	implement	the	registration	system.		
See	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	of	Intent,	21.06.2018.		‘Settled	status’	is	
sometimes	used	interchangeably	with	‘indefinite	leave	to	remain’	which	is	a	key	concept	of	UK	
immigration	law.	
11	S.	Giubboni,	‘Free	movement	of	persons	and	European	solidarity,	13	European	Law	Journal,	
(2007)	p.360;	D.	Thym,	The	elusive	limits	of	solidarity:	residence	rights	of	and	social	benefits	for	
economically	inactive	union	citizens,	52	Common	Market	Law	Review(2015),	p.17;	E.	Spaventa,	
‘Earned	Citizenship:	Understanding	Union	Citizenship	Through	its	Scope’	in	D.	Kochenov	(ed)	EU	
provides	for	a	more	or	less	fair	balance,	one	has	to	realise	its	proper	functioning	
so	far	appears	to	have	been	dependent	on	a	set	of	conditions,	none	of	which	is	
realised	in	the	context	of	Brexit:	
	
1) The	Directive	allows	the	Member	States	to	introduce	a	registration	
system	which	requires	EU	citizens	to	register	soon	after	arrival.		It	equally	
provides	that	EU	citizens	have	acquired	permanent	residence	once	they	
have	legally	resided	for	five	years	in	the	country	on	the	basis	of	the	
conditions	of	the	Directive.			Member	States	are	required	to	provide	a	
procedure	allowing	these	citizens,	if	they	desire	so,	to	receive	a	
permanent	residence	document	that	confirms	that	status.		Most	Member	
States	have	introduced	an	obligatory	initial	registration	system.	As	a	
result	people	have	some	proof	of	their	residence	status	from	arrival,	
which	facilitates	acquiring	a	permanent	residence	document	if	they	desire	
to	obtain	one	after	five	years.		Yet,	people	will	rarely	apply	for	such	a	
permanent	residence	document	since	the	initial	registration	is	most	often	
sufficient	to	profit	from	the	full	protection	of	rights	provided	by	EU	
citizenship,	and	absence	of	the	permanent	residence	document	does	not	
necessarily	imply	you	have	not	acquired	permanent	residence.		
The	UK,	instead,	has	never	introduced	a	compulsory	registration	system	
on	arrival;	which	echoes	the	UK’s	overall	lack	of	a	general	population	
register	or	use	of	ID	cards.	EU	citizens	were	given	all	the	rights	provided	
by	the	Citizens’	Directive	without	a	registration	system,	requiring	them	
simply	to	present	a	European	ID	or	passport	when	accessing	services.		
They	were	not	asked	to	provide	proof	of	being	in	work	or	having	
sufficient	resources	and	comprehensive	sickness	insurance.			As	a	result,	
people	also	did	not	feel	the	need	to	ask	for	a	permanent	residence	card	
once	they	were	five	years	in	the	country.		Brexit	puts	this	system	on	its	
head.		The	UK	would	now	introduce	a	compulsory	registration,	not	only	
on	arrival	but	even	for	permanent	residence.		Moreover,	this	requirement	
would	now	retroactively	be	applied	to	those	already	in	the	country.	
Suddenly	requiring	proof	in	relation	to	entitlement	that	is	based	on	
conditions	that	may	go	back	years	or	decades	is	highly	problematic	as	
people	might	fail	to	provide	evidence	of	initial	arrival	and	compliance.			It	
is	easy	here	to	see	the	risk	of	a	potential	repeat	of	the	Windrush	scandal	
in	which	people	were	equally	asked	to	provide	proof	of	entitlement	for	
situations	years	and	decades	ago,	while	they	had	been	considered	to	be	
living	in	the	UK	legally	all	that	time.			
	
2) The	Directive’s	system	of	registration	for	permanent	residence	is	
declaratory,	so	absence	of	the	document	does	not	mean	you	are	not	
entitled.	Furthermore,	people	only	risk	losing	entitlements	when	the	State	
has	reasonable	doubt	that	they	are	a	burden	on	their	welfare	system,	
rather	than	the	State	being	able	to	apply	checks	systematically.12	
																																																																																																																																																														
Citizenship	and	Federalism:	the	Role	of	Rights,	(Cambridge	University	Press	2017)	p.204;	D.	Thym	
(ed)	Questioning	EU	Citizenship	Judges	and	the	Limits	of	Free	Movement	and	Solidarity	in	the	EU	
(Hart	2017);	F.	Pennings	and	M.	Seeleib-Kaiser	(eds)	EU	Citizenship	and	Social	Rights	Entitlements	
and	Impediments	to	Accessing	Welfare	(Elgar	2018).		
12	Article	14	Directive	2004/38/EC.	
Instead,	the	registration	system	that	the	UK	will	introduce	after	Brexit	
will	be	constitutive	in	nature.		At	the	request	of	the	UK,	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	gives	the	option	to	set	up	either	a	constitutive	registration	
system,13	or	keep	the	existing	declaratory	system.14	Unlike	in	a	
declaratory	system,	in	a	constitutive	system	one	has	to	successfully	apply	
in	order	to	obtain	the	status.		In	case	one	is	rejected	or	has	not	made	an	
application,	one	loses	all	entitlements	and	faces	deportation.		The	
consequences	of	not	holding	a	‘settled	status’	document	are	thus	much	
harder-hitting	than	when	one	does	not	hold	a	permanent	residence	
document	under	EU	law.		In	the	latter	declaratory	system,	absence	of	the	
document	does	not	mean	you	are	not	entitled.	Even	if	your	application	is	
rejected	you	might	still	be	able	to	stay	on	a	temporary	basis,	or	might	be	
able	to	return	under	free	movement	provisions.		In	the	UK	post-Brexit	
instead,	there	is	no	such	‘fall-back	protection’	of	general	free	movement	
provisions	if	you	fail	your	settled	status	application.	Moreover,	
the	consequences	of	a	constitutive	registration	system	can	be	particularly	
dire	if	combined	with	the	UK’s	so-called	‘hostile	environment’	policy	to	
immigration.15	Prior	to	becoming	Prime	Minister,	Theresa	May	as	Home	
Secretary	introduced	a	policy	she	deliberately	called	‘the	hostile	
environment’	to	illegal	immigration.			The	‘hostile	environment’	forces	all	
sorts	of	public	and	private	actors,	from	hospitals	to	banks	and	schools,	to	
actively	check	for	citizens	not	having	the	required	papers.			Once	
identified,	people	lose	all	entitlements;	they	won’t	have	access	to	
healthcare	and	benefits	(and	may	be	asked	to	pay	back	whatever	they	
have	received	over	many	years),	they	will	lose	their	job	(as	their	
employer	will	be	fined	otherwise),	their	bank	account	is	frozen;	and	they	
are	asked	to	leave	the	country;	failure	of	which	leads	to	forced	
deportation,	which	can	happen	prior	to	any	recourse	to	appeal.		While	it	is	
not	the	place	here	to	discuss	whether	this	is	an	appropriate	way	to	deal	
with	‘illegal	immigrants’,	the	key	issue	is	that	the	UK	has	applied	such	
‘hostile	environment’	measures	even	to	people	who	are	legally	entitled	to	
stay	but	struggled	to	prove	their	entitlement.		This	is	mainly	due	to	the	
fact	that	the	UK	has	no	proper	system	of	registration	and	identity	cards,	
while	the	Home	Office	has	a	remarkably	high	administrative	error	rate16		
																																																								
13	Article	17	(1)	to	(3)	Withdrawal	Agreement.	
14	Article	17(4)	Withdrawal	Agreement.	
15	Independent	Chief	Inspector	of	Borders	and	Immigration,	‘Inspection	Report	of	the	hostile	
environment’	(October	2016),	available	at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/inspection-report-of-hostile-environment-
measures-october-2016;	and	K.	McDonald,	‘What	is	Hostile	Environment,	Theresa	May’s	policy	
that	led	to	the	Windrush	scandal	and	other	problems’,	News	The	Essential	Daily	Briefing	(April	
17th	2018),	at	https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/what-is-hostile-environment-theresa-may-
windrush-eu-citizens-legal-immigrants/.		
16	Reports	by	the	Parliamentary	and	Health	Service	Ombudsman	show	that	the	Home	Office	is	
one	of	the	main	departments	receiving	complaints	and	has	the	highest	uphold	rate.	In	the	second	
quarter	of	2017,	47%	of	the	14,170	determined	appeals	against	Home	Office	immigration	
decisions	were	granted.		See	House	of	Commons	Home	Affairs	Committee,	‘Immigration	Policy:	
basis	for	building	consensus’,	Second	Report	of	2017-2019,	HC500,	10,	January	2018,	paragraph	
43.	
and	applies	Kafkaesque	burden	of	proof	requirements.			The	dramatic	
consequences	of	this	approach	have	been	clearly	illustrated	by	the	
Windrush	scandal.		People	who	had	been	living	legally	in	the	country	for	
decades	suddenly	lost	their	entitlement	to	cancer	treatment,	were	asked	
to	pay	back	years	of	social	benefits,	were	sacked	by	their	employer,	were	
refused	re-entry	into	the	country	after	a	short	trip	abroad	and	thereby	cut	
off	from	their	family,	were	detained	in	deportation	centres	and	removed.	
	
3) The	Directive	is	implemented	within	the	context	of	the	judicial	oversight	
and	the	remedies	provided	by	EU	law.	EU	citizens	can	rely	on	direct	effect	
and	supremacy,	while	they	have	access	to	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure.			Moreover,	the	infringement	procedure	ensures	top-down	
control	over	Member	States’	implementation	of	EU	law.	Once	the	UK	
leaves	the	EU,	this	comprehensive	system	is	no	longer	in	place.		As	I	will	
argue	in	more	detail	below,	there	are	some	doubts	about	to	what	extent	
‘direct	effect’	as	promised	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	will	be	ensured.		
Equally,	it	is	uncertain	to	what	extent	UK	judges	will	make	use	of	the	
option	to	refer	a	preliminary	ruling	to	the	CJEU.		Moreover,	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	no	longer	offers	the	infringement	procedure	as	a	
way	to	control	respect	of	EU	law.	
		
Hence,	while	the	EU	pretends	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	will	offer	(nearly)	the	
same	protection	to	EU	citizens	as	the	rights	they	currently	hold	under	the	
Citizens’	Directive,	the	acceptance	of	a	constitutive	system,	combined	with	past	
and	current	UK	immigration	legacy	means	that	a	copy-and-paste	of	the	Citizens’	
Directive	can	have	dramatic	consequences	once	the	country	is	no	longer	part	of	
the	EU.	
This	can	best	be	illustrated	by	taking	into	account	the	way	the	UK	has	until	now	
implemented	the	registration	for	permanent	residence	under	the	Citizens’	
Directive.		As	that	system	is	declaratory	not	many	EU	citizens	have	felt	the	need	
to	apply	for	a	permanent	residence	card,	although	applications	increased	after	
the	Brexit	referendum	as	people	hoped	permanent	residence	would	give	them	
more	protection.17		Many	who	have	applied	did	so	in	order	to	subsequently	apply	
for	British	citizenship18	since	successful	registration	of	permanent	residence	has	
become	a	precondition	for	citizenship	in	2015.19		
However,	while	application	to	obtain	a	permanent	residence	card	was	not	
compulsory,	the	system	has	been	particularly	complicated	in	terms	of	requiring	
proof	of	residence.	EU	citizens	have	to	apply	via	a	85	page	long	application	
document,	with	poor	guidelines,	and	have	to	provide	extensive	documentation	
																																																								
17	295.000	EU	citizens	were	granted	PR	status	in	the	period	2004	to	2017.		58%	of	those	were	in	
2016	and	2017.		See	The	Migration	Observatory,	‘Unsettled	Status.	Which	EU	citizens	are	at	risk	
of	failing	to	secure	their	rights	after	Brexit?,	12	April	2018,	at	
http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/unsettled-status-which-eu-citizens-
are-at-risk-of-failing-to-secure-their-rights-after-brexit/		
18	In	the	period	2004	to	2017,	148.000	EU	citizens	obtained	British	citizenship.		Ibid.	footnote	16.	
19	Applications	by	EU	citizens	went	up	slightly	after	introducing	this	requirement,	but	went	up	
dramatically	after	the	Brexit	referendum,	see	data	in	P.	Duncan	and	L.	O’Carroll,	‘Sharp	rise	in	
number	of	EU	nationals	applying	for	UK	citizenship’,		The	Guardian,	14	March	2018,	at	
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/14/sharp-rise-in-number-of-eu-nationals-
applying-for-uk-citizenship	
(in	original	or	certified	documents)	to	show	they	have	complied	with	the	
Citizens’	Directives’	requirements	of	being	either	in	work	(or	having	been	in	
work)	or	having	sufficient	resources	and	comprehensive	sickness	insurance.		The	
application	process	has	been	so	complicated	that	28%	of	EU	citizens	applying	for	
it	failed	their	application.20	
If	the	UK’s	registration	system	for	‘settled	status’	post-Brexit	is	based	on	a	
similar	burden	of	proof	requirement,	the	consequences	would	be	dramatic.		
Unlike	for	the	declaratory	PR	system,	all	3.5	million	EU	citizens	will	be	obliged	to	
register	under	the	new	constitutive	system,	and	failure	of	the	application	will	
mean	immediately	being	faced	with	all	the	consequences	of	the	‘hostile	
environment’,	losing	all	entitlements	and	facing	deportation.		A	28%	rejection	
under	these	conditions	would	be	a	nightmare.	
	
Yet,	there	is	little	in	the	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	that	would	prevent	the	UK	
from	introducing	a	registration	system	nearly	as	demanding	in	terms	of	burden	
of	proof	as	its	previous	permanent	residence	system,	because	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	mainly	copies	the	criteria	and	discretion	available	to	the	Member	
States	in	the	Citizens’	Directive.			Article	17(1)	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	
does	try	to	set	some	limits	to	avoid	that	the	UK’s	burdensome	permanent	
residence	procedure	would	be	copied	into	a	constitutive	registration	system	for	
settled	status.		For	instance,	it	should	be	possible	that	supporting	documents,	
other	than	identity	documents	may	be	submitted	in	copy	(art.	17(1)j).	It	requires	
that	the	application	process	should	be	‘smooth,	transparent	and	simple’,	‘any	
unnecessary	administrative	burdens	have	to	be	avoided’	(art.	17(1)e);	and	
application	forms	have	to	be	‘short,	simple	and	user-friendly’	(art.	17(1)f).	
However,	much	of	this	remains	open	to	interpretation,	particularly	in	the	
absence	of	established	case	law	and	uncertainty	about	how	much	a	say	the	Court	
of	Justice	will	get	on	this	matter.		Most	importantly,	it	does	not	alter	the	main	
qualifying	criteria,	based	on	being	in	work	or	having	sufficient	resources,	and	the	
difficulty	of	proving	these	retrospectively.		
		
The	UK	could	still	ask	for	a	high	number	of	documents	to	prove	work	status	or	
having	sufficient	resources,	even	to	prove	situations	several	decades	ago.		It	may	
equally	still	require	those	not	in	work	to	prove	they	have	a	comprehensive	
sickness	insurance.		The	latter	requirement	has	been	particularly	problematic	in	
the	UK,	since	the	UK	has	not	accepted	that	having	access	to	the	National	Health	
Service	(NHS)	fulfils	the	requirement	of	having	comprehensive	sickness	
insurance.		All	EU	citizens	residing	in	the	UK	have	been	given	access	to	the	NHS,	
so	hardly	any	(and	particularly	not	those	who	are	not	in	work)	have	taken	a	
private	health	insurance.		It	is	even	questionable	that,	given	the	broad	reliance	
on	the	NHS,	any	of	the	existing	private	insurance	schemes	could	even	be	
considered	to	be	‘comprehensive’.21		Hence,	requiring	a	comprehensive	sickness	
																																																								
20	Reiss	Edwards,	Immigration	Lawyers	London,	‘Home	Office	Rejects	over	28%	Permanent	
Residency	Applications	–	Report’	at	https://immigrationlawyers-london.com/blog/high-
permanent-residence-rejection-rates.php	
21	A.	Herbeć,	‘The	scandal	of	CSI,	the	little-known	loophole	used	to	deny	EU	citizens	permanent	
residency’,	available	at:	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03/17/disheartened-and-
disappointed-the-government-and-universities-have-failed-eu-citizens-over-comprehensive-
sickness-insurance/	
insurance	and	not	considering	NHS	access	as	complying	with	that	requirement	
would	virtually	automatically	exclude	all	those	who	are	not	in	work.		The	
European	Commission	has	criticised	the	UK	on	this	point22,	but	never	taken	
enforcement	action	on	the	issue.		If	there	were	already	problems	with	the	way	in	
which	the	UK	implemented	the	Citizens’	Directive	while	still	in	the	EU,	it	will	
become	even	more	challenging	when	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	applies	the	
same	criteria	for	the	UK	when	supranational	supervision	will	be	even	weaker,	
and	the	registration	is	not	a	declaratory	but	a	constitutive	one,	suddenly	
applying	to	3.5	million	people.	
			
	
From	political	statements	to	legal	commitments	
	
The	UK	is	fully	aware	that	applying	a	similar	system	as	its	permanent	residence	
application	procedure	would	constitute	an	administrative,	social	and	political	
disaster.	Registering	3.5	million	citizens	via	a	procedure	similar	to	the	
permanent	residence	application	would	require	huge	administrative	resources	
and	take	decades.		At	the	same	time,	deporting	over	28%	of	the	3.5million	EU	
citizens	is	not	desirable	politically,	economically	or	socially.	So	the	UK	has	signed	
up	to	some	procedural	limitations	to	the	constitutive	registration	system	as	set	
out	in	Article	17	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	as	discussed	above.		Additionally,	
the	UK	has	promised	politically	to	introduce	a	simple	registration	procedure	
based	only	on	proof	of	legal	residence,	identity	and	criminality	check.	This	has	
been	translated	into	a	‘Statement	of	Intent’,	announcing	a	proposal	for	the	
registration	system.23	
The	Government	has	explicitly	stated	that	it	would	not	apply	the	requirements	of	
comprehensive	sickness	insurance	and	being	in	‘genuine	and	effective	work’.24		
In	theory,	the	latter	would	imply	that	the	UK	would	not	check	on	being	in	work	at	
all,	and	that	no	means	testing	would	be	applied	either.		Under	EU	law	means	
testing	is	only	applicable	if	one	is	not	in	‘genuine	and	effective	work’,	and	it	is	the	
latter	definition	by	which	the	CJEU	has	set	out	the	parameters	of	what	can	be	
asked	in	terms	of	proof	of	being	in	work.		Yet,	the	precise	intentions	of	the	
Government	remain	unclear.		It	has	said	it	will	introduce	an	online	registration	
procedure,25	based	on	identity	and	declaration	of	residence	and	whether	one	has	
a	criminal	record.	The	Government	will	then	check	whether	this	is	confirmed	by	
existing	databases,	particularly	from	the	tax	office	HMRC	and	Department	for	
Work	and	Pensions.		This	raises	the	question	of	what	proof	will	be	required	of	
people	who	are	not	(sufficiently)	in	these	databases.		Will	those	people	still	be	
required	to	show	proof	of	being	in	work	or	having	sufficient	resources?	The	list	
																																																								
22	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm	
23	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	of	Intent,	21.06.2018.	This	will	take	the	form	of	
an	amendment	of	the	Immigration	Rules;	see	discussion	below.	
24	HM	Government,	‘Technical	Note.	Citizens’	rights	-	Administrative	procedures	in	the	UK’,	7	
November	2017,	paragraph	11;	at	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-
rights-administrative-procedures-in-the-uk;	and	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	
of	Intent,	21.06.2018.	
25	HM	Government,	‘Technical	Note.	Citizens’	rights	-	Administrative	procedures	in	the	UK’,	7	
November	2017,	paragraph	6;	at	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-
administrative-procedures-in-the-uk	
of	acceptable	documents	of	proof	listed	in	the	Statement	of	Intent26	suggests	that	
some	people	might	be	able	to	provide	sufficient	proof	even	if	not	in	work	or	
without	sufficient	resources,	but	the	insistence	that	the	evidence	should	neatly	
cover	the	continuity	of	residence	during	five	years	might	prove	difficult	for	those	
not	in	work.		Moreover,	this	is	so	far	only	a	statement	of	intent;	and	even	if	
turned	into	law,	the	conditions	might	be	easily	amenable.	
	
The	basic	finding	remains	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	still	leaves	the	UK	the	
nearly	full	discretion	of	the	Citizens’	Directive;	so	its	requirements	can	go	from	
asking	a	single	document	showing	residence	prior	to	Brexit	which	would	allow	
nearly	EU	citizens	to	obtain	settled	status,	to	a	burdensome	process	similar	to	its	
permanent	residence	registration	system,	which	could	lead	to	over	28%	getting	
a	letter	to	leave	the	country.		Moreover,	as	I	will	show	below,	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	does	not	provide	guarantees	that	these	criteria	would	be	set	out	in	
primary	legislation,	thus	making	these	criteria	open	to	adjustments	by	executive	
action	and	EU	citizens	at	risk	of	a	gradual	undermining	of	their	status.	
	
So	why	has	the	EU	not	made	more	effort	to	ensure	the	UK’s	political	statements	
would	be	turned	into	legal	commitments	and	avoid	so	many	of	its	citizens	risk	
deportation?		
The	European	Commission	has	taken	a	formalistic	approach	arguing	that	EU	
citizens	retain	the	same	entitlements	as	under	the	EU	Citizens’	Directive,	and	
thus	pretending	they	are	not	at	risk.	However,	that	fails	to	acknowledge	that	
these	criteria	cannot	operate	in	the	same	way	when	they	are	applied	in	a	country	
that	never	had	registration	and	will	introduce	a	constitutive	registration	system	
when	it	is	no	longer	a	Member	of	the	EU.		The	refusal	to	accept	this	reasoning	
seems	to	be	inspired	by	the	fear	that	writing	more	details	into	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	on	a	simpler	registration	system	in	the	UK	would	put	the	other	27	
Member	States	under	pressure	to	apply	a	similar	procedure,	and	thus	de	facto	
undermine	the	discretion	allowed	by	the	Citizens’	Directive.		However,	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	is	an	international	treaty.		It	can	set	particular	provisions	
for	the	UK	(as,	in	fact,	it	does	on	other	issues),27	and	this	approach	would	be	
justified	by	the	fact	that	the	legal	situation	in	a	country	out	of	the	EU	is	not	
identical	to	that	of	countries	in	the	EU.	Hence,	legally	this	can	be	done	within	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	without	imposing	new	requirements	on	the	other	27	
Member	States.			Nevertheless,	if	there	is	political	reluctance	by	the	remaining	
Member	States,	an	alternative	solution	is	to	set	out	the	UK’s	political	statements	
regarding	a	simple	registration	based	merely	on	residence,	ID	and	criminality	
check	into	a	Protocol	attached	to	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		Such	a	Protocol	
would	be	a	binding	commitment	by	the	UK	on	how	it	will	implement	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement.28			
																																																								
26	Annex	A	to	the	Statement	of	Intent.	
27	E.g.	Article	4	Withdrawal	Agreement	addresses	particularly	how	the	UK	should	implement	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement;	Article	151	makes	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	applicable	to	the	
UK,	while	Article	152	requires	the	creation	of	independent	authority	to	monitor	implementation	
of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	only	in	the	UK.		
28	For	a	detailed	proposal	on	what	such	a	Protocol	could	look	like,	see	S.	Smismans,	‘Brexit	and	
EU	Citizens’	Rights:	A	proposal	for	a	Protocol’,	12	June	2018,	at	
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/06/brexit-and-eu27-citizens-rights.html.			
	Given	that	the	Brexit	withdrawal	negotiations	are	based	on	the	principle	‘nothing	
is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed’,	such	a	revision	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	or	the	inclusion	of	a	Protocol	specific	for	the	UK	is	still	possible.		
Whether	this	is	politically	achievable	depends	on	several	factors.	It	is	not	clear	to	
what	extent	the	formalistic	approach	of	the	European	Commission	was	really	
inspired	by	substantive	resistance	from	the	Member	States.		Although	the	
European	Council	and	the	Council	have	defined	guidelines	for	the	Brexit	
negotiation,	the	process	has	been	strongly	driven	by	the	European	Commission,	
within	a	very	short	time	frame,	leaving	the	Member	States	little	time	to	get	
through	the	nitty-gritty	complex	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement.29			Whether	the	UK	is	ready	to	agree	to	such	a	revision	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	or	to	signing	up	to	a	separate	Protocol	depends	on	
bargaining	power	in	the	negotiations.		From	its	perspective,	it	comes	down	to	
setting	out	legally	a	commitment	it	had	already	made	politically,	but	it	might	be	
very	reluctant	to	do	so	at	an	international	level.	Yet,	the	UK	government	might	be	
willing	to	do	so	if	the	EU	offered	freedom	of	movement	throughout	the	entire	EU	
for	the	British	already	residing	in	Europe,	which	remains	the	biggest	weakness	of	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement	for	this	group.		The	European	Parliament	might	be	
the	ultimate	dealmaker	on	this	issue.		It	has	presented	itself	as	the	big	defender	
of	citizens’	rights	in	the	Brexit	negotiations	and	has	repeatedly	stated	it	will	not	
approve	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	if	it	has	no	guarantees	on	their	protection.		
Yet,	to	defend	EU	citizens	properly	it	has	to	realise	that	the	key	issue	is	not	
whether	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	copies	all	rights	of	the	citizens’	Directive,	
including	the	right	of	residence	for	a	third	country	spouse,	but	whether	it	
provides	procedural	guarantees	on	the	registration	system	that	take	into	account	
the	particular	challenges	of	the	UK	post-Brexit.		
	
	
THE	PROCEDURAL	FLAW	OF	THE	WITHDRAWAL	AGREEMENT	
	
How	to	ensure	direct	effect:	from	Joint	Report	to	Withdrawal	Agreement	
	
There	is	no	doubt	that	the	Joint	Report	agreed	by	the	EU	and	the	UK	in	December	
2017	is	aimed	at	giving	citizens’	rights	strong	protection.		The	key	relevant	
provisions	of	the	Joint	Report	read	as	follows:	
	
34.	Both	Parties	agree	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	should	provide	for	
the	legal	effects	of	the	citizens'	rights	Part	both	in	the	UK	and	in	the	Union.	
UK	domestic	legislation	should	also	be	enacted	to	this	effect.		
	
35.	The	provision	in	the	Agreement	should	enable	citizens	to	rely	directly	
on	their	rights	as	set	out	in	the	citizens'	rights	Part	of	the	Agreement	and	
should	specify	that	inconsistent	or	incompatible	rules	and	provisions	will	
be	disapplied.		
																																																								
29	E.g.	the	European	Commission	published	its	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	on	28	February	
2018,	after	which	it	negotiated	with	the	UK,	and	presented	an	UK-EU	draft	Withdrawal	
Agreement	on	19	March.		The	Member	States	had	then	just	a	bit	more	than	a	week	to	consider	
they	could	agree	with	that	at	the	European	Council	meeting	of	22	and	23	March.	
	36.	The	UK	Government	will	bring	forward	a	Bill,	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	&	Implementation	Bill,	specifically	to	implement	the	
Agreement.	This	Bill	will	make	express	reference	to	the	Agreement	and	
will	fully	incorporate	the	citizens'	rights	Part	into	UK	law.	Once	this	Bill	
has	been	adopted,	the	provisions	of	the	citizens'	rights	Part	will	have	
effect	in	primary	legislation	and	will	prevail	over	inconsistent	or	
incompatible	legislation,	unless	Parliament	expressly	repeals	this	Act	in	
future.	The	Withdrawal	Agreement	will	be	binding	upon	the	institutions	
of	the	Union	and	on	its	Member	States	from	its	entry	into	force	pursuant	
to	Article	216(2)	TFEU.		
	
The	Joint	Report	thus	clearly	commits	to	ensuring	the	continuing	‘supranational’	
character	of	citizens’	rights	by	requiring	direct	effect	and	primacy	of	these	
provisions.			Paragraph	36	provides	further	detail	on	how	the	UK	has	to	
implement	the	protection	provided	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		More	
precisely,	it	clearly	states	this	has	to	be	done	via	a	Withdrawal	Agreement	and	
Implementation	Bill	().	
Paragraph	36	might	seem	ambiguous	at	first	sight.30			On	the	one	hand,	it	
requires	that	the	Implementation	Bill	‘will	fully	incorporate	the	citizens’	rights	
Part	into	UK	law’.		This	could	be	read	as	requiring	that	all	citizens’	rights	
provisions	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	need	to	be	copied	into	the	
Implementation	Bill	(in	order	to	have	effect).	
On	the	other	hand,	the	UK	and	EU	agreed	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	will	
provide	for	direct	effect	and	supremacy	of	these	provisions	(para.35).			The	UK	
Government	had	initially	made	confusing	statements	on	how	it	would	ensure	
direct	effect.		The	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	David	Davis,	
suggested	when	referring	to	‘direct	effect,	if	you	like’,	that	the	mere	
incorporation	of	Withdrawal	Agreement	citizens’	rights	provisions	in	national	
primary	legislation	would	as	such	guarantee	direct	effect.31			However,	that	
would	not	allow	citizens	to	rely	directly	on	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	in	the	
case	of	contradiction	between	national	law	and	the	Agreement.		To	ensure	direct	
effect	one	needs	a	provision	in	the	Implementation	Bill	that	recognises	the	
supranational	features	of	citizens’	rights,	in	a		similar	way		as	the	European	
Communities	Act	recognises	the	supranational	features	of	European	law.	
																																																								
30	See	M.	Elliot,	‘The	Brexit	Agreement	and	citizens’	rights.	Can	Parliament	deliver	what	the	
Government	has	promised?’,	11	December	2017,	at		
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/12/11/the-brexit-agreement-and-citizens-rights-can-
parliament-deliver-what-the-government-has-promised/	
31	This	statement	appeared	to	be	mere	covering	up	of	the	initial	UK	negotiation	position	that	they	
would	not	accept	direct	effect,	as	stated	in	paragraph	3	of	the	‘Technical	Note:	Implementing	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement”	(13	July	2017):	“It	would	be	both	inappropriate	and	unnecessary	for	the	
agreement	to	require	the	UK	to	bring	the	EU	concept	of	direct	effect	into	its	domestic	law.	The	
same	substantive	result	can	be	achieved	if	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	requires	the	UK	to	give	
citizens	specified	rights,	and	the	UK	enacts	domestic	legislation	whose	effect	is	to	bestow	those	
rights.	Not	only	will	EU	citizens	be	able	to	enforce	those	rights	through	the	UK’s	domestic	legal	
system,	but	the	UK’s	compliance	with	its	international	obligations	can	also	be	enforced	using	
whatever	mechanisms	the	agreement	includes	for	the	resolution	of	disputes”;	at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-implementing-the-
withdrawal-agreement	
	
The	question	is	then	whether,	if	direct	effect	is	guaranteed	via	a	specific	
provision	in	primary	legislation,	it	is	still	required	or	useful	to	copy	the	citizens’	
rights	provisions	fully	into	primary	legislation?	From	a	EU	law	perspective	there	
is	no	requirement	in	that	sense.			About	half	of	the	EU	Member	States,	for	
instance,	transpose	EU	Directives	mainly	via	secondary	rather	than	primary	
legislation,32	which	does	not	impede	that	some	provisions	of	these	Directives	
have	direct	effect.		However,	we	are	not	dealing	here	with	the	implementation	of	
a	Directive	when	a	country	is	part	of	the	EU,	but	the	implementation	of	an	
international	agreement	in	a	country	no	longer	part	of	the	EU.			I	will	argue	
below	that	in	such	a	context	it	is	important	to	ensure	both	direct	effect	and	the	
incorporation	of	citizens	rights	in	primary	legislation	in	order	to	protect	EU	
citizens	properly.		It	is	not	a	question	of	either	a	direct	effect	provision,	or	the	full	
copying	of	citizens’	rights	into	primary	legislation.		The	two	guarantees	can	be	
combined.					
	
However,	compared	to	the	Joint	Report,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	appears	
more	synoptic	in	its	wording	on	how	the	UK	should	ensure	direct	effect	and	
proper	implementation	of	citizens’	rights.	The	Joint	Report	expressed	political	
agreement	but	had	to	be	translated	into	a	proper	legal	text.	This	was	done	at	the	
initiative	of	the	European	Commission	and	subsequently	amended	in	negotiation	
with	the	UK.		On	19	March	2018,	the	UK	and	EU	presented	their	joint	draft	text	of	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		Much	of	this	was	coloured	in	green,	indicating	
agreement	between	the	two	parties,	although	even	for	those	“green”	provisions	
the	EU	sticks	to	the	principle	that	‘nothing	is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed’.			
	
Article	4	(1)	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	(coloured	green)	states	the	following:	
	
“1.	Where	this	Agreement	provides	for	the	application	of	Union	law	in	the	
United	Kingdom,	it	shall	produce	in	respect	of	and	in	the	United	Kingdom	
the	same	legal	effects	as	those	which	it	produces	within	the	Union	and	its	
Member	States.	
	In	particular,	Union	citizens	and	United	Kingdom	nationals	shall	be	able	
to	rely	directly	on	the	provisions	contained	or	referred	to	in	Part	Two.	
Any	provisions	inconsistent	or	incompatible	with	that	Part	shall	be	
disapplied.”	
	
This	clearly	confirms	the	principle	of	direct	effect	and	supremacy	in	relation	to	
citizens’	rights,33	as	was	promised	in	paragraph	35	of	the	Joint	Report.	
	
While	Article	4(1)	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	coloured	green,	and	the	principle	of	
direct	effect	and	supremacy	of	citizens’	rights	is	thus	agreed,	the	way	in	which	
																																																								
32	European	Parliament,	Directorate	General	Internal	Policies	of	the	Union,	‘Comparative	Study	of	
Transposition	of	EC	law	in	the	Member	States’,	June	2007,	PE	378.294.	
33	The	first	paragraph	of	the	Article	also	raises	the	question	of	whether	provisions	in	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	other	than	those	of	the	citizens’	rights	part	can	have	direct	effect.	This	
would	follow	from	the	broad	requirement	that	the	UK	has	to	give	the	same	legal	effect	to	Union	
law	referred	to	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	as	it	produces	within	the	Union.		At	the	same	time,	
it	is	only	in	relation	to	citizens’	rights	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	clearly	wanted	to	avoid	
any	doubt	on	the	matter.	
the	UK	is	supposed	to	implement	this	appears	far	less	settled.		Article	4(2)	
Withdrawal	Agreement	is	rudimentary	in	this	regard:	
	
“The	United	Kingdom	shall	ensure	compliance	with	paragraph	1,	
including	as	regards	the	required	powers	of	its	judicial	and	administrative	
authorities,	through	domestic	primary	legislation.”	
	
Moreover,	this	paragraph	has	not	been	coloured	green,	indicating	there	is	no	
agreement	on	how	the	UK	should	guarantee	the	‘supranational	character’	of	
citizens'	rights.	Compared	to	the	commitment	of	the	Joint	Report,	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	shows	three	particular	weaknesses	relating	to	how	the	
UK	should	implement	citizens’	rights.		
	
Firstly,	the	Joint	Report	provided	a	strong	definition	of	how	supremacy	should	be	
ensured,	requiring	that	only	express	repeal	of	the	Implementation	Bill	(and	thus	
also	its	provisions	on	direct	effect	and	supremacy)	would	allow	for	national	law	
to	override	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	provisions	on	citizens’	rights.		Such	
express	repeal	would	blow	up	the	entire	Brexit	Withdrawal	Agreement,	so	the	
UK	would	have	a	strong	incentive	not	to	undermine	citizens’	rights.				There	is	
doubt,	though,	on	whether	UK	public	law	allows	such	a	strong	legislative	
entrenchment.34	The	experience	of	the	European	Communities	Act,	and	case	law	
such	as	Jackson,35	Thoburn,36	HS237	and	Miller38	suggest	that	the	Implementation	
Bill	could	be	made	highly,	but	not	necessarily	absolutely,	resistant	to	implied	
repeal.		However,	much	depends	on	the	precise	wording	of	the	Implementation	
Bill	in	this	regard	(and,	the	political	feasibility	of	living	up	to	such	high	level	of	
legislative	entrenchment	promised	in	the	Joint	Report	is	questionable,	to	say	the	
least).			As	Mark	Elliot	argues,39	in	the	end,	even	if	Parliament	commits	to	such	
strong	terms	in	the	Implementation	Bill,	one	will	have	to	wait	to	see	how	the	
judiciary	sets	the	final	terms	of	this.		
Given	the	uncertainty	about	the	extent	to	which	legislative	entrenchment	is	
possible	under	the	UK	Constitution,		one	may	understand	that	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	(which	is	a	legally	binding	text)	is	less	explicit	on	this	than	the	Joint	
Report	(which	is	a	mere	political	agreement).		The	Withdrawal	Agreement	does	
not	explicitly	mention	that	only	express	repeal	could	bring	an	end	to	the	
supremacy	of	these	norms.	Although	the	requirement	of	Article	4(1)	that	‘any	
provisions	inconsistent	or	incompatible	with	that	Part	shall	be	disapplied’	can	be	
considered	as	an	unconditional	statement	of	the	supremacy	principle,	the	
generic	way	in	which	its	implementation	is	defined	in	Article	4(2)	is	likely	to	give	
more	leeway	to	the	British	legislator	to	provide	a	definition	that	would	impose	
fewer	limits	on	its	future	action	than	one	that	only	allows	express	repeal.		The	
Withdrawal	Agreement’s	more	‘neutral’	wording	seems	more	in	line	with	the	
																																																								
34	See	M.	Elliott,	see	above	footnote	23;	and,	more	positively,	M.	Gordon,	‘Parliamentary	
Sovereignty	and	the	Implementation	of	the	EU	Withdrawal	Agreement’	(17	January	2018)	
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/01/17/mike-gordon-parliamentary-sovereignty-and-the-
implementation-of-the-eu-withdrawal-agreement-part-i/	
35	R.	(Jackson)	v.	Attorney	General	[2005]	UKHL	56.	
36	Thoburn	v	Sunderland	City	Council	[2003]	QB	151	(Div	Ct)	
37	R	(HS2	Action	Alliance	Ltd)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Transport	[2014]	UKSC	3	
38	R	(Miller)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	[2017]	UKSC	5	
39	Ibid.		
EU’s	constitutional	dialogue	tradition	with	its	Member	States.		That	being	said,	
for	EU	citizens	it	means	less	protection	than	what	the	Joint	Report	proposed.	
	
Secondly,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	does	not	refer	to	the	Implementation	Bill,	
but	simply	requires	for	the	citizens’	rights	status	to	be	ensured	via	primary	
legislation.			This	could	mean	that	these	rights	could	be	dealt	with	in	more	than	
one	act	of	primary	legislation,	and	that	they	could,	for	instance,	be	partially	
covered	in	a	separate	piece	of	primary	legislation	dealing	with	immigration	law.	
This	would	detract	from	the	particular	status	of	these	rights	as	guaranteed	by	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement,	and	make	it	more	likely	that	they	are	interpreted	in	the	
light	of	provisions	and	principles	of	immigration	law.		
	
Thirdly,	and	most	importantly,	the	text	does	not	refer	to	the	full	incorporation	of	
the	citizens’	rights	provisions	in	the	Implementation	Bill,	or	even	primary	
legislation.		Article	4(2)	Withdrawal	Agreement	requires	primary	legislation	to	
ensure	direct	effect	and	supremacy	of	the	citizens’	rights	provisions.		However,	
this	could	be	met	by	setting	out	in	primary	legislation	a	specific	provision	to	that	
effect,	in	a	similar	way	as	the	European	Communities	Act	does	today.		Having	
done	that,	the	draft	version	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	does	not	prevent	the	
UK	from	implementing	the	citizens’	part	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	via	
secondary	legislation.	The	principles	of	direct	effect	and	supremacy	could	be	set	
out	in	the	Implementation	Bill,	probably	together	with	provisions	that	require	
future	coordination	with	the	EU,	such	as	on	social	security	entitlements	built	up	
in	different	countries.		However,	the	Government	might	be	inclined	to	set	out	
much	of	the	citizens’	rights	provisions,	such	as	the	criteria	for	registration,	in	
secondary	legislation.				
The	Withdrawal	Agreement	appears	thus	built	on	the	assumption	that	by	
transferring	the	concept	of	direct	effect	into	an	international	agreement	
applicable	to	a	non-EU	country,	EU	citizens	would	be	properly	protected	as	if	
they	were	within	the	EU.			Unfortunately,		I	will	argue	in	the	following	section	
that	this	fails	to	take	into	account	the	particular	challenges	of	implementation	in	
a	non-EU	country,	as	well	as	the	substantive	flaw	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	
	
	
	
Why	citizens’	rights	need	to	be	set	out	in	primary	legislation	(despite	the	
direct	effect	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement)	
	
The	added	value	of	having	all	provisions	in	one	text.	
	
The	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	a	complex	text,	with	multiple	references	to	other	
EU	texts,	such	as	the	Citizens’	Directive	and	the	Social	Security	Coordination	
Regulations.		Although	it	provides	individual	rights,	it	is	written	as	directed	to	
the	UK	and	the	27	Member	States.		Some	of	these	provisions	also	leave	a	level	of	
discretion	as	to	how	the	UK	and	EU27	will	achieve	the	objectives	set.		
Implementation	by	national	administrations	and	courts	will	be	strongly	
facilitated	if	the	rights	set	out	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	are	copied	in	the	
Implementation	Bill,	together	with	the	transposition	measures	that	allow	some	
discretion	for	the	UK.			Respect	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	can	then	most	
often	be	assured	simply	by	relying	on	direct	effect	establishing	a	contradiction	
between	the	Implementation	Bill	and	the	Agreement	rather	than	having	to	rely	
on	direct	effect	in	relation	to	a	multitude	of	(secondary	legislative)	acts.		In	the	
absence	of	a	Implementation	Bill	that	incorporates	the	rights	set	out	in	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	as	comprehensively	as	possible,	EU	citizens	would,	for	
some	aspects,	have	to	rely	directly	on	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	(which	then	
refers	to	other	EU	law),	while	for	other	aspects	potentially	on	several	acts	of	
primary	legislation	(e.g,	on	the	Implementation	Bill	for	issues	of	future	social	
security	coordination	with	the	EU;	or	on	a	new	immigration	bill	for	issues	
concerning	registration),	and	most	likely,	on	many	acts	of	secondary	legislation.			
One	can	avoid	such	complexity	by	comprehensively	setting	out	the	citizens’	
rights	provisions	within	the	Implementation	Bill.		The	risk	that	courts,	but	in	
particular	national	administrations	and	private	actors	such	as	banks	or	
landlords,	fail	to	identify	the	proper	rules	applicable	to	EU	citizens	is	thus	
reduced.		At	the	same	time,	as	I	will	argue	in	more	detail	below,	having	all	
provisions	in	one	single	text	facilitates	monitoring	by	the	EU	on	whether	the	UK	
is	living	up	to	its	promises.			
	
	
The	added	value	of	having	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	set	out	in	detail	in	an	act	
of	primary	legislation	
	
What	is	the	added	value	of	setting	out	in	detail	citizens’	rights	in	primary	
legislation	if	direct	effect	is	already	ensured	via	a	specific	provision	in	such	
legislation?	
Firstly,	to	put	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	into	practice,	further	implementation	
measures	will	need	to	be	taken,	which	go	beyond	ensuring	direct	effect,	or	even	
beyond	literally	copying	Agreement	provisions	into	primary	legislation.		For	
instance,	as	explained	above,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	leaves	considerable	
discretion	regarding	the	registration	procedure	and	the	requirements	to	obtain	
permanent	residence,	such	as	being	in	work	or	having	sufficient	resources.		The	
Government	has	promised	not	applying	criteria	such	as	comprehensive	sickness	
insurance	and	‘genuine	and	effective	work’.		However,	if	these	promises	are	not	
set	out	into	primary	legislation,	simple	ministerial	intervention	or	changing	
administrative	practice	could	substantially	undermine	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	at	
any	time.			These	implementation	decisions	will	affect	the	most	fundamental	
rights	of	residence,	family	life,	healthcare	etc.	of	thousands	of	people	who	have	
already	held	these	rights	for	years	and	decades.		It	could	not	be	just	left	to	the	
Government	or	a	Minister	to	decide	and	amend	these	rights.		They	will	need	to	be	
enshrined	by	Parliament	into	primary	legislation.			
It	is	true	that	secondary	legislation	in	the	UK	is	not	entirely	free	from	
parliamentary	scrutiny.		There	are	two	main	scrutiny	procedures	for	such	
secondary	legislation.40	In	the	negative	procedure,	the	statutory	instrument	
would	be	made	and	come	into	force	without	parliamentary	action	but	could	be	
annulled,	on	a	motion	of	either	House.	In	the	affirmative	procedure,	the	statutory	
instrument	would	be	debated	(usually	by	a	delegated	legislation	committee	in	
																																																								
40	R.	Kelly,	‘The	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill:	scrutiny	of	secondary	legislation	(Schedule	
7)’,	House	of	Commons	Library	Briefing	Paper	Number	08172,	7	December	2017,	p.8.	
the	House	of	Commons,	and	in	the	Chamber	in	the	House	of	Lords)	and	could	
only	be	made	after	being	approved	by	both	Houses	of	Parliament.		However,	such	
scrutiny	does	not	give	Parliament	any	opportunity	to	amend	the	regulations	
brought	forward	by	the	Government,	which	means	that	in	most	cases	Parliament	
will	have	no	impact	on	such	secondary	legislation.		It	requires	finding	a	majority	
in	Parliament	that	so	radically	disagrees	with	the	measure	that	it	prefers	its	
annulment	to	going	ahead,	which	is	highly	unlikely	as	Government	will	feel	
comfortable	about	its	majority	in	Parliament.		In	practice,	blocking	or	even	
debating	Regulations	almost	never	happens.41		Hence,	it	is	essential	that	the	
political	commitments	the	UK	has	already	made	about	the	implementation	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	are	set	out	in	primary	legislation.			Without	such	legal	
entrenchment	the	promises	about	a	simple	registration	system	based	on	
residence	rather	than	being	in	work	could	be	quickly	or	gradually	undermined	
by	administrative	action	at	the	expense	of	many	people.		
	
Secondly,	enshrining	norms	into	primary	legislation	ensures	stability	and	
visibility,	and	facilitates	enforcement	and	monitoring.	This	makes	it	easier	to	
show	if	administrative	practice	breaches	primary	legislation	than	having	to	rely	
on	international	norms.	At	the	same	time	it	is	easier	to	monitor	the	respect	of	
key	legislative	acts	against	international	norms	than	having	to	monitor	respect	of	
the	latter	by	a	continuous	screening	of	ever	changing	norms	of	secondary	
legislation	and	administrative	practice.		UK	immigration	law	in	particular	is	
infamous	for	continuing	ministerial	intervention	and	amendments,42	creating	
uncertainty	for	those	involved.	From	this	perspective	it	is	not	only	useful	to	set	
out	in	primary	legislation	the	implementation	choices	over	which	the	UK	has	
discretion,	but	equally	to	incorporate	fully	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement.		This	is	particularly	the	case	as	there	are	some	
limitations	to,	and	doubts	about	the	‘supranational	features’	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement.		The	combination	‘secondary	legislation	+	direct	effect’	might	work	
when	a	country	is	part	of	the	EU	and	full	judicial	control	under	EU	law	is	
guaranteed.		However,	that	is	no	longer	the	case.	
	
After	Brexit,	EU	citizens	will	no	longer	profit	from	the	infringement	procedure.		
Instead,	Article	152	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	requires	the	UK	to	set	up	an	
‘Independent	Authority’	to	monitor	the	implementation	of	the	Agreement.		
However,	such	arrangement	by	which	the	UK	is	asked	to	monitor	itself	is	far	
from	the	supranational	enforcement	that	is	guaranteed	via	the	infringement	
procedure.43	
Non-respect	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	can	also	be	dealt	with	in	the	
arbitration	mechanism	set	up	by	it.	Article	162	of	the	draft	Withdrawal	
Agreement		even	provides	that	failure	of	arbitration	could	lead	to	one	of	the	
																																																								
41	Ibid.	
42	Between	2012	and	2018	alone,	UK	immigration	rules	have	been	changed	57	times	in	secondary	
legislation.	https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/archive-immigration-rules	
43	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	the	only	way	to	ensure	a	properly	independent	and	functioning	
monitoring	authority	is	by	establishing	a	UK-EU	Joint	Authority.	S.	Smismans	,	‘EU	citizens	in	the	
UK	are	in	a	particularly	weak	position	and	need	an	independent	authority	to	monitor	their	
rights’,	LSE	Brexit	Blog,	21st	April	2018,		http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/eu-citizens-in-
the-uk-are-in-a-particularly-weak-position-and-need-an-independent-authority-to-monitor-
their-rights/	
parties	taking	the	issue	to	the	CJEU	for	final	decision	(although	this	part	of	the	
draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	remains	under	discussion).		However,	such	
arbitration,	even	if	ultimately	leading	to	a	CJEU	decision,	starts	as	a	more	
political	process,	and	cannot	be	triggered	by	individual	action.		It	remains	to	be	
seen	to	what	extent		such	political	monitoring	can	keep	track	of	ever	changing	
norms	of	secondary	legislation	and	administrative	practice.		Instead,	the	UK	will	
be	very	much	in	the	spotlight	of	the	EU	when	it	adopts	its	Implementation	Bill.		
By	setting	out	citizens’	rights	provisions	in	detail	in	the	Implementation	Bill,		the	
EU	could	monitor	respect	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	before	the	limelight	is	
dimming.	
In	the	absence	of	strong	monitoring	mechanisms,	EU	citizens	will	have	to	rely	on	
direct	effect	and	court	action	to	test	the	validity	of	national	norms	against	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement.		This	can	become	highly	challenging	if	these	norms	are	
continuously	changing	in	secondary	legislation	and	administrative	practice.		The	
problem	is	further	exacerbated	by	the	limits	to	and	doubts	about	the	
effectiveness	of	the	‘supranational	character’	of	citizens’	rights	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement.	
As	mentioned	above,	there	is	still	some	ambiguity	on	how	the	UK	will	ensure	
direct	effect,	and	to	what	extent	the	primacy	of	citizens’	rights	can	be	entrenched.		
Moreover,	in	addition	to	legal	entrenchment,	the	issue	is	also	one	of	practical	
implementation	of	supranational	principles	in	daily	judicial	practice	when	the	
UK	is	no	longer	a	Member	of	the	EU.	The	supranational	features	of	EU	law	(such	
as	direct	effect,	supremacy,	and	option	to	refer	to	the	CJEU)	have	worked	to	the	
extent	that	the	judiciary	considers	itself	to	be	part	of	the	EU	judicial	order.		As	
the	UK	will	have	left	the	EU,	it	remains	to	be	seen	to	what	extent	the	judiciary	
feels	committed	to	relying	on	these	principles	and	tools,	applicable	just	for	
citizens’	rights	under	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.			There	might	be	a	reluctance	
to	apply	direct	effect;	at	least	until	the	Supreme	Court	has	clearly	spoken	out	on	
it.		Even	more	so	one	can	question	whether	judges	will	make	any	use	of	the	
potential	to	refer	to	the	CJEU,	for	which	they	have	considerable	discretion.44	UK	
courts	have	traditionally	already	been	more	reluctant	than	judges	in	many	other	
EU	countries	to	make	use	of	the	preliminary	reference	procedure.45	Brexit	will	
only	increase	that	reluctance.	
There	are	also	doubts	to	what	extent	citizens	will	still	have	the	possibility	to	
claim	Francovich	damages46	(currently	also	applicable	in	case	of	failure	to	
comply	with	EU	law	by	a	national	court	in	final	appeal,	Köbler).47		
																																																								
44	On	the	behavioral	factors	influencing	the	willingness	of	national	judges	to	refer,	see	M.	Broberg	
and	N.	Fenger,	Preliminary	references	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	(Oxford	University	Press	
2014	,2nd	ed)	p.49.	
45	T.	Tridimas,	‘Knocking	on	heaven’s	door:	fragmentation,	efficiency	and	defiance	in	the	
preliminary	reference	procedure’,	Common	Market	Law	Review	(2003),	p.	9	at	p.	38.	
46	The	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	not	explicit	on	this.	Article	4(1)	of	the	Agreement	states	that	
where	the	Agreement	provides	for	the	application	of	Union	law,	it	should	produce	‘the	same	legal	
effects	as	those	which	it	produces	within	the	Union	and	its	Member	States’.		‘The	same	legal	
effects’	would	imply	the	opportunity	to	claim	Francovich	damages.		However,	aspects	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement,	such	as	Article	17(1)	defining	the	constitutive	registration	system,	are	
not	Union	law	to	which	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	refers,	but	new	provisions	set	by	the	
Agreement	itself.		It	can	be	questioned	whether	‘same	legal	effects’	can	be	extended	to	such	
provisions;	which	would	make	the	entire	Agreement	Union	law,	which	seems	contradictory	to	
the	intention	of	Article	4(1).	
47	CJEU,	Case	C-224/01.	Gerhard	Köbler	v	Republic	of	Austria.	
		
Hence,	the	more	doubts	that	remain	about	the	proper	respect	for	the	
supranational	character	of	citizens'	rights,	the	more	important	it	is	to	ensure	
these	rights	are	also	set	out	in	primary	legislation.		This	will	not	protect	against	
future	legislative	action,	but	it	will	at	least	protect	against	the	potential	gradual	
undermining	of	these	rights	via	secondary	legislation,	while	it	allows	the	EU	to	
monitor	UK	implementation	when	the	Implementation	Bill	is	in	the	spotlight,	
rather	than	having	to	look	at	a	fluidity	of	norms	set	out	in	a	context	where	
‘supranational	supervision’	can	no	longer	be	what	it	once	was.		
	
It	is	worth	noting	in	this	regard	that	the	EU	Citizens’	Directive	has	been	
implemented	in	the	UK	by	way	of	Regulations,	which	is	secondary	legislation.			
However,	it	would	be	wrong	to	deduce	that	it	would	therefore	be	right	to	also	
implement	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	via	
Regulations.			A	Directive	is	embedded	in	the	protection	of	the	EU’s	supranational	
judicial	system.		If	national	law	does	not	respect	the	Directive,	the	latter	can	be	
relied	upon	directly.		Doubts	on	its	interpretation	can	be	settled	via	preliminary	
rulings	of	the	CJEU.		Failure	of	a	Member	State	to	comply	can	lead	to	enforcement	
action	and	financial	sanctioning	by	the	CJEU,	or	damages	via	the	national	court.		
As	just	analysed,	this	comprehensive	system	is	not	available	for	non-compliance	
with	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		The	
‘supranational	character’	of	its	citizens’	rights	is	limited,	and	object	of	
considerable	uncertainty	regarding	its	application.			In	the	absence	of	proper	
supranational	supervision,	EU	citizens	need	a	dual	guarantee;	direct	effect	on	the	
one	hand,	and	legislative	protection	against	administrative	undermining	of	their	
rights	on	the	other	hand.			
	
The	added	value	of	having	citizens’	rights	set	out	in	the	Implementation	Bill	and	
not	in	another	act	of	primary	legislation.	
	
Setting	out	citizens’	rights	in	the	Implementation	Bill	rather	than	any	other	act	of	
primary	legislation	strengthens	the	visibility	of	the	specific	status	of	these	rights	
as	protected	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		This	would	avoid	the	risk	that	some	
of	the	rights,	such	as	those	requiring	future	coordination	with	the	EU	(e.g.	on	
social	security	entitlements)	would	be	set	out	in	the	Implementation	Bill,	while	
others,	such	as	those	related	to	the	registration	procedure,	would	be	set	out	in	
immigration	law.		Besides	the	issue	of	decreased	clarity	as	rights	would	be	
dispersed	in	different	texts,	the	inclusion	of	EU	citizens'	rights	in	immigration	
law	would	increasingly	push	interpretation	of	these	rights	into	the	general	
approach	of	UK	immigration	law	and	further	away	from	EU	law	and	the	
guarantees	provided	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		
	
One	can	conclude	that	there	are	good	reasons	to	combine	direct	effect	with	a	
requirement	to	set	out	in	detail	citizens’	rights	in	the	Implementation	Bill.		
Unfortunately,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	only	explicitly	requiring	the	first.		
In	the	absence	of	the	latter,	EU	citizens	remain	in	a	weak	spot,	given	the	
limitations	to	the	‘supranational	character’	of	protection	when	a	country	is	no	
longer	a	member	of	the	EU.			The	EU	should	therefore	abandon	its	complacent	
stance	in	the	negotiations	and	realise	that	just	copying	direct	effect	is	not	
sufficient	to	face	the	unique	implementation	challenges	in	the	UK.		The	
Withdrawal	Agreement	should	require	that	its	citizens’	rights	provisions,	as	well	
as	specific	commitments	by	the	UK	regarding	the	registration	system	set	out	in	a	
Protocol,	will	need	to	be	copied	into	primary	legislation.	
Without	such	a	requirement,	the	UK	is	likely	to	implement	much	of	the	citizens’	
rights	provisions	via	secondary	legislation,	as	I	will	explain	in	the	next	section.	
	
	
	
THE	UK’S	LEGAL	FRAMEWORK	TO	IMPLEMENT	THE	WITHDRAWAL	
AGREEMENT	AND	CITIZENS’	RIGHTS	
	
The	relationship	between	Withdrawal	Act	and	Implementation	Bill	
	
While	the	UK	has	been	negotiating	with	the	EU	over	the	terms	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement,	it	has	adopted	the	Withdrawal	Act	to	repeal	the	European	
Communities	Act	and	decide	the	rules	on	how	it	will	deal	with	the	legacy	of	the	
acquis	communautaire.		However,	the	Act	does	not	deal	with	the	specific	category	
of	citizens’	rights	protected	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		On	the	one	hand,	this	
makes	sense	as	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	still	has	to	be	adopted.		On	the	other	
hand,	it	is	also	odd	since	the	Act	seems	to	be	aimed	at	a	comprehensive	definition	
of	how	EU	law	will	be	retained	or	not	after	Brexit.		The	specific	sui	generis	nature	
of	citizens’	rights	is	not	accounted	for.			They	constitute	a	sort	of	‘super-retained	
EU	law’	as	they	also	retain	part	of	their	supranational	nature.	Unlike	any	norm	of	
EU-derived	or	retained	law	under	the	Withdrawal	Act,	the	citizens’	rights	
provisions	should,	according	to	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	have	direct	effect	
and	supremacy,	and	profit	from	the	temporary	protection	of	the	CJEU	via	
preliminary	references,	as	well	as	from	the	international	arbitration	mechanism	
set	up	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		
Since	the	Withdrawal	Act	does	not	deal	with	citizens’	rights,	the	commitments	
made	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	regarding	their	special	status	will	need	to	be	
translated	into	national	law	by	way	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	and	
Implementation	Bill	(Implementation	Bill).			
To	understand	the	role	of	the	Implementation	Bill	it	is	useful	to	remind	here	first	
the	difference	between	approval	and	implementation	of	an	international	treaty	
under	UK	law.		The	Government	has	announced	it	will	present	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	for	approval	by	way	of	a	Resolution	to	be	adopted	in	the	two	
Houses.48		The	Supreme	Court	noted	in	Miller49	in	January	2017	that	such	a	
resolution	does	not	have	any	legislative	effect,	but	is	nevertheless	“an	important	
political	act”.50	In	addition	to	this	vote,	the	Constitutional	Reform	and	
Governance	Act	2010	allows	for	the	House	of	Commons	to		block	ratification	of	
an	international	agreement.		If	the	Houses	adopt	the	Resolution	to	approve	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	and	ratification	is	not	blocked,	the	Agreement	will	then	
																																																								
48	Procedures	for	the	Approval	and	Implementation	of	EU	Exit	Agreements:	Written	statement	-	
HCWS342,	13	December	2017.	
49	R	(Miller)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	[2017]	UKSC	5.	
50	J.	Simson	Caird,	‘Parliament	and	the	Withdrawal	Agreement:	The	“Meaningful	Vote”’,	U.K.	
Const.	L.	Blog	(9th	Feb.	2018)	(available	at	https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)	
need	to	be	implemented	by	an	Act	of	Parliament.		In	the	UK’s	dualist	system	such	
an	Act	is	required	for	international	norms	to	come	into	force	into	national	law.	
The	Government	has	announced	that	it	will	introduce	the	Implementation	Bill	to	
that	effect.51		
At	the	stage	of	writing	this	article,	the	Government	has	made	not	public	any	
indications	on	what	the	Implementation	Bill	will	look	like.		This	leaves	many	
questions	on	how	citizens’	rights	will	be	dealt	with	in	the	Bill;	more	particularly:	
1) how	will	direct	effect	be	defined?		
2) to	what	extent	will	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement		be	copied	into	the	Bill?	
3) To	what	extent	will	implementation	choices	for	which	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	leaves	discretion	be	settled	by	the	Bill,	e.g.	in	relation	to	the	
substantive	requirements	to	obtain	settled	status?	
4) To	what	extent	will	the	Bill	provide	a	delegation	to	the	Government	to	
implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	via	secondary	legislation	and	
administrative	action?	
	
As	analysed	above,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	only	explicit	regarding	the	first	
of	these	issues,	namely	the	requirement	to	set	out	direct	effect	into	primary	
legislation	(and	still	on	this	issue	there	is	doubt	on	whether	the	Bill	will	and	can	
live	up	to	the	promise	of	‘express	repeal’	set	out	in	the	Joint	Report).	At	the	same	
time,	whether	provisions	will	be	copied	into	the	Bill,	whether	substantive	
implementation	choices	will	be	set	out	by	it,	and	which	delegation	to	
Government	is	provided,	all	are	issues	which	can	profoundly	affect	the	legal	
status	of	EU	citizens.				
Unfortunately,	while	we	still	do	not	know	what	the	Bill	will	look	like,	two	
initiatives	of	the	Government	suggest	it	is	strongly	inclined	to	deal	with	EU	
citizens’	rights	extensively	via	secondary	legislation	rather	than	safeguarding	
these	rights	in	the	Implementation	Bill.		Firstly,	the	Government	has	tried	in	the	
Withdrawal	Act	to	give	itself	powers	to	implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	
rather	than	leaving	such	implementation	to	Parliament.		Secondly,the	
Government	intends	to	pre-empt	the	legislative	space	by	adopting	
‘implementation	measures’	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	even	prior	to	the	
Agreement	being	adopted.		
	
The	Withdrawal	Act:	defining	the	future	role	of	Parliament	in	
implementing	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	
	
The	Withdrawal	Act	does	not	deal	with	citizens’	rights	directly,	but	it	does	so	
indirectly	by	defining	the	respective	role	of	Government	and	Parliament	in	the	
implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	When	the	Government	
introduced	the	Withdrawal	Act	in	Parliament	in	July	2017	it	provided	sweeping	
powers	for	the	Government	to	implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	
	
Article	9(1)	stated:	
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A	Minister	of	the	Crown	may	by	regulations	make	such	provision	as	the	
Minister	considers	appropriate	for	the	purposes	of	implementing	the	
withdrawal	agreement	if	the	Minister	considers	that	such	provision	
should	be	in	force	on	or	before	exit	day.52	
	
Such	powers	would	be	extensive	as,	according	to	Article	9(2)	‘regulations	under	
this	section	may	make	any	provision	that	could	be	made	by	an	Act	of	
Parliament’.53		The	Withdrawal	Act	does	set	some	limits	on	their	use.	Most	
importantly,	these	powers	cannot	be	used	after	exit	day,	and	the	Act	defines	
some	matters	in	which	they	cannot	be	used.	Such	government	action	would,	in	
theory,	also	not	entirely	avoid		parliamentary	scrutiny,	as	such	secondary	
legislation	would	be	subject	to	either	the	positive	or	negative	scrutiny	procedure.		
However,	as	established	above,	these	scrutiny	procedures	hardly	ever	lead	to	
Parliament	discussing	or	blocking	secondary	legislation.		
	
Not	surprisingly,	Article	9	was	hotly	debated	in	Parliament.	An	amendment	was	
introduced	(at	the	initiative	of	Dominic	Grieve	MP)	which	made	the	powers	to	
implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	via	regulations		
“subject	to	the	prior	enactment	of	a	statute	by	Parliament	approving	the	
final	terms	of	withdrawal	of	the	United	Kingdom	from	the	European	
Union.”54	
	
The	amendment	was	not	born	out	of	a	concern	with	citizens’	rights.	Rather,	it	
was	seen	as	a	way	for	Parliament	to	get	a	foot	in	the	door	on	the	decision	and	
direction	of	Brexit.		The	Government	has	long	been	reluctant	to	give	Parliament	a	
definitive	say	on	Brexit.		The	Grieve	amendment	does	set	some	legally	binding	
commitment	on	this	issue,	but	its	impact	in	terms	of	allowing	Parliament	to	
shape	the	direction	of	Brexit	is	likely	to	be	limited.		The	power	given	to	
Parliament	is	to	approve	the	Withdrawal	Agreement;	but	it	does	not	afford	it	a	
role	in	the	negotiations.	Its	potential	impact	on	the	Government	negotiation	
position	by	threatening	non-approval	is	also	likely	to	be	limited	since,	due	to	the	
time	table	set	by	the	Article	50	TEU	procedure,	non-approval	would	probably	
lead	to	the	UK	falling	into	the	legal	limbo	of	a	no	deal	Brexit.			
Yet,	while	the	Grieve	amendment	may	have	little	impact		on	the	direction	of	
Brexit,	it	has	an	important	consequence	in	defining	the	role	of	Parliament	in	the	
implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		The	executive	powers	provided	
in	Article	9	can	only	be	used	after	Parliament	has	approved	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	by	statute.	This	means	the	political	approval	via	Resolution	is	not	
sufficient	to	trigger	these	powers,	and	the	Government	will	only	be	able	to	act	on	
this	basis	after	adoption	of	the	Implementation	Bill.		This	gives	Parliament	the	
first	say	regarding	the	implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	
																																																								
52	The	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill	(HC	Bill	5)	as	introduced,	13.07.2017,		available	at	
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/cbill_2017-
20190005_en_1.htm		
53	The	initial	version	of	the	Withdrawal	Act	as	introduced	even	gave	the	power	for	such	
Regulation	to	amend	the	Withdrawal	Act	itself.	
54	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill	(HLBill	79),	as	introduced	in	House	of	Lords,	18.01.2018,	at	
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0079/lbill_2017-
20190079_en_1.htm		
Of	course,	Parliament’s	room	for	manoeuvre	in	implementation	is	constrained	by	
the	terms	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		Yet,	particularly	on	citizens’	rights,	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	leaves	considerable	discretion	to	the	UK	(and	remaining	
Member	States)	regarding	different	options	of	implementation,	for	instance,	in	
relation	to	the	criteria	and	burden	of	proof	to	obtain	settled	status.		Thanks	to	
the	Grieve	amendment,	these	important	implementation	choices	can	be	made	by	
Parliament,	rather	than	just	be	set	out	into	secondary	legislation.	
The	question	is	whether	Parliament	will	take	up	this	role.		Obviously,	the	Bill	will	
be	introduced	by	the	Government.		Given	its	clear	preference	to	hold	wide	
powers	to	implement	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	it	is	still	likely,	despite	the	
Grieve	amendment,	it	will	prefer	to	implement	citizens’	rights	mainly	via	
secondary	legislation.		It	can	attempt	to	do	this	in	two	ways.			It		may	introduce	
an	Implementation	Bill	that	provides	little	detail	on	citizens’	rights,	while	at	the	
same	time	preparing	Regulations	with	further	implementation	measures,	which	
will	be	presented	as	secondary	legislation	immediately	after	adoption	of	the	Bill	
on	the	basis	of	Article	9	of	the	Withdrawal	Act.			Alternatively,	it	simply	can	
introduce	an	Implementation	Bill	with	little	detail	but	which	includes	a	broad	
delegation	for	the	Government	to	take	further	implementation	measures.			The	
latter	strategy	is	more	likely	than	the	former	because	such	delegation	extends	
beyond	exit	day,	unlike	Article	9	powers.55		
In	both	cases,	Parliament	has	the	chance	to	disagree	with	the	Government’s	
‘minimal	approach’	to	the	Implementation	Bill	and	can	insist,	via	amendments,	
that	the	Bill	itself	sets	out	more	detail	on	citizens’	rights.	However,	it	remains	to	
be	seen	to	what	extent	the	Parliament	will	take	up	this	role.	As	explained	above,	
the	Withdrawal	Agreement	does	not	require	Parliament	to	do	anything	else	than	
ensuring	direct	effect.	Moreover,	while	the	debate	on	the	Withdrawal	Act	shows	
that	Parliament	has	been	keen	to	carve	itself	a	role	in	the	decision	and	direction	
of	Brexit,	it	is	not	obvious		it	is	particularly	preoccupied	with	protecting	the	
status	of	EU	citizens.	Finally,	and	most	problematically,	I	will	show	in	the	
following	section	that	the	Government	is	already	attempting	to	pre-empt	the	
regulatory	space	on	EU	citizens’	rights,	even	prior	to	debating	the	
Implementation	Bill.			
	
	
Pre-empting	the	legislative	space	via	secondary	legislation		
	
As	argued	above,	the	UK	intends	to	set	up	a	constitutive	registration	system	
through	which	all	EU	citizens	residing	in	the	UK	before	the	end	of	the	transition	
period	will	have	to	apply	to	obtain	settled	status.	The	Government	plans	first	to	
set	up	a	‘voluntary	registration’	system,	prior	to	exit	day56		and	subsequently	an	
obligatory	registration	procedure,	meaning	that	all	EU	citizens	will	need	to	be	
registered	by	the	end	of	the	‘grace	period’	(which	lasts	six	months	after	the	end	
																																																								
55	From	this	perspective,	the	Grieve	amendment	has	largely	reduced	the	usefulness	of	Article	9	
powers,	although	they	remain	available	(prior	to	exit)	for	as	far	as	the	Implementation	Bill	does	
not	provide	clear	delegation	powers.	
56	HM	Government,	“Technical	Note.	Citizens’	rights	-	Administrative	procedures	in	the	UK”,	7	
November	2017,	paragraph	4;	at	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-
administrative-procedures-in-the-uk	
of	the	transition	period).57		The	introduction	of	a	voluntary	registration	prior	to	
Brexit	is	remarkable	as	such	registration	is	aimed	at	conferring	a	status	that	still	
has	to	be	defined	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		The	intention	is	to	detach	the	
initial	registration	from	the	coming	into	force	of	the	full	legal	status	it	will	
eventually	confer.			People	applying	during	the	voluntary	registration	period	will	
first	obtain	‘indefinite	leave	to	remain’,	which	is	a	status	under	immigration	law.	
After	exit	and	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	coming	into	force,	the	Implementation	
Bill	would	need	to	ensure	that	these	people	also	hold	the	extra	rights	that	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	provides.		Interestingly	enough,	those	applying	after	exit	
are	still	said	to	obtain	‘indefinite	leave	to	remain’,	with	some	extra	add-ons	
provided	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		So	the	Statement	of	Intent	makes	clear	
that	EU	citizens	will	primarily	provided	with	an	existing	status	of	immigration	
law.		During	the	transition	period	EU	citizens	will	also	still	be	able	to	assert	their		
free	movement	rights,	even	if	they	fail	the	registration	procedure.58		A	person	
refused	status	under	the	scheme	before	the	end	of	transition	can	still	make	a	new	
application	until	the	end	of	the	grace	period.59	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	
(voluntary)	registration	is	without	risk.		Although	the	proposed	registration	
system	does	not	check	all	conditions	required	to	qualify	under	free	movement,	
the	procedure	may	be	sufficient	to	ascertain	that	one	does	not.	So	people	who	
wrongly	assumed	being	legally	in	the	UK	under	EU	law,	or	who	are,	but	failed	to	
prove	so,	might	still	be	asked	to	leave	within	the	limits	provided	by	EU	law.		
	
By	introducing	a	registration	system	prior	to	the	adoption	of	the	Withdrawal	
Agreement	and	by	assigning	EU	citizens	a	status	of	immigration	law,	the	
Government	appears	clearly	intent	on	bypassing	the	constraints	of	the	
Withdrawal	Act	in	terms	of	parliamentary	scrutiny.	From	the	start	of	the	Brexit	
negotiations,	the	Government	has	been	keen	to	stress	that	the	new	status	would	
be	one	of	UK	immigration	law,	insisting	that	the	concept	of	‘settled	status’	
familiar	to	immigration	law	would	be	used,	rather	than	the	EU	law	concept	of	
‘permanent	residence’.60		This	leaves	considerable	scope	to	bypass	Parliament	as	
immigration	law	relies	widely	on	executive	action,	and	as	far	as	Parliamentary	
involvement	is	concerned	it	often	relies	simply	on	the	negative	resolution	
procedure,	which	does	not	require	express	approval	from	Parliament.		
Immigration	law	is	therefore	typically	criticised	for	side-lining	Parliament	as	
substantive	changes	may	often	not	be	debated,	considered	or	scrutinised	by	
Parliament.61	The	Statement	of	Intent	is	not	explicit	on	whether	the	negative	or	
positive	scrutiny	procedure	will	be	used,	but	there	is	no	doubt	that	it	intends	to	
																																																								
57	The	transition	period	runs	from	first	day	after	exit	day	(29	March	2019)	until	31	December	
2020,	and	ensures	the	full	application	of	the	EU	law	in	the	UK,	including	all	those	arriving	prior	to	
that	date	can	still	apply	residence	status.	In	the	subsequent	six	months	there	is	an	additional	
‘grace	period’,	during	which	people	who	arrived	prior	to	31	December	2020	can	still	register.	
58	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	of	Intent,	21.06.2018,	p.22,	indent	5.20.	
59	Ibid,	p.22,	indent	5.18.	
60	The	Statement	of	Intent	repeatedly	uses	the	concept	‘indefinite	leave	to	remain’	
interchangeably	with	‘settled	status’.		This	is	highly	confusing	because	indefinite	leave	to	remain	
is	a	well	established	concept	of	immigration	law,	which	is	an	inferior	status	to	the	rights	set	out	
in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	which	the	Statement	of	Intent	proclaims	to	respect.	
61	Joint	Council	for	the	Welfare	of	Immigrants,	‘How	Immigration	rules	evade	democracy’,	22	
December	2010,	http://www.jcwi.org.uk/2010/12/22/how-immigration-rules-evade-
democracy	
introduce	the	settled	status	scheme	via	secondary	legislation	under	Immigration	
Rules	prior	to	the	adoption	of	the	Implementation	Bill.		
	
This	leaves	several	unanswered	questions	about	the	extent	to	which	citizens’	
rights	will	be	protected	by	the	Implementation	Bill.		As	argued	above,	the	Bill	
needs	to	include	a	provision	on	direct	effect.		The	Statement	of	Intent	also	
clarifies	that	the	creation	of	the	independent	authority	and	the	creation	of	a	right	
to	appeal	for	the	scheme	will	have	to	be	set	out	in	primary	legislation,62	which	
could	be	the	Implementation	Bill.		The	Bill	will	also	need	to	include	a	mechanism	
that	ensures	that	all	those	who	successfully	apply	(prior	or	post	exit)	profit	from	
all	the	rights	provided	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	and	not	simply	the	inferior	
status	of	indefinite	leave	to	remain.			However,	the	Statement	of	Intent	is	not	
explicit	about	this	and	refuses	to	refer	to	a	status	specific	to	EU	citizens.63		The	
Government’	s	intention	is	clearly	to	define	the	EU	citizens’	status	as	indefinite	
leave	to	remain	under	immigration	law	via	secondary	legislation.	Moreover,	the	
procedure	and	conditions	to	obtain	that	status	will	be	set	out	in	secondary	
legislation.			This	makes	their	status	very	vulnerable	to	future	changes	by	
secondary	legislation,	as	well	as	to	interpretation	via	immigration	law	concepts	
and	case	law.		
	
It	is	questionable	whether	the	Government’s	intention	to	adopt	the	settled	status	
scheme	via	Immigration	Rules	respects	the	requirement	of	Article	9	of	the	
Withdrawal	Act	that	implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	via	
secondary	legislation	is	only	possible	after	the	Implementation	Bill	has	been	
adopted.		From	an	immigration	law	perspective	it	is	indeed	possible	to	introduce	
the	settled	status	scheme	via	secondary	legislation.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	
argue	that	this	scheme,	which	defines	profoundly	the	rights	that	EU	citizens	will	
hold	and	sets	out	fully	the	conditions	under	which	they	can	obtain	it,	is	not	an	
implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		Hence,	from	that	perspective	it	is	
difficult	to	see	how	this	respects	the	Withdrawal	Act’s	requirement	of	Article	9	
that	implementation	of	the	Withdrawal	Act	needs	first	to	pass	through	an	act	of	
Parliament	before	secondary	legislation	can	be	adopted.	
		
The	Government	is	likely	to	‘legalise’	its	premature	intervention	by	seeking	its	
confirmation	in	the	Implementation	Bill.		It	will	argue	that	the	system	is	already	
(substantially)	in	place,	and	will	propose	a	broad	delegation	of	powers	allowing	
it	in	the	future	to	continue	dealing	with	EU	citizens’	rights	mainly	via	secondary	
legislation.		By	setting	out	the	scheme	under	immigration	law	first	and	
subsequently	proposing	a	‘minimal’	Implementation	Bill,	the	Government	thus	
pre-empts	the	regulatory	space.		The	question	is	whether	Parliament	wants	to	
re-enter	that	regulatory	space.		So	far	Parliament	has	not	shown	a	particular	
concern	for	the	protection	of	EU	citizens’	rights	or	the	belief	that	there	is	a	need	
for	guarantees	in	primary	legislation,	and	it	might	be	happy	simply	to	
																																																								
62	Home	Office,	EU	Settlement	Scheme:	Statement	of	Intent,	21.06.2018,	p.6,	indent	1.9	and	p.22,	
indent	5.19.		
63	The	Statement	of	Intent	only	states	that	the	‘practical	arrangement’	of	the	
scheme	will,	in	the	future,	have	to	reflect	in	full	the	agreement	on	citizens’	rights	
reached	with	the	EU.		Ibid.	p.6,	indent	1.8,	
rubberstamp	a	solution	the	Government	has	already	set	up	and	wants	to	protract	
via	secondary	legislation.	
As	I	have	argued	above,	such	a	solution,	in	which	much	of	the	status	of	EU	
citizens	is	set	out	in	secondary	legislation	would	profoundly	weaken	their	
position.		As	the	Windrush	scandal	has	illustrated,	being	at	the	mercy	of	changing	
secondary	legislation	and	implementation	rules	of	UK	immigration	law	is	not	a	
comfortable	position	to	be	in.		Unlike	the	Windrush	generation,	EU	citizens	will	
still	be	able	to	rely	on	direct	effect;	but,	as	analysed	above,	given	the	limitations	
to	the	supranational	features	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	that	will	not	offer	a	
similar	protection	of	their	rights	as	they	have	today.	
	
CONCLUSION	
	
Despite	promises	from	both	the	UK	and	the	EU	that	EU	citizens	residing	in	the	
UK	and	British	citizens	residing	in	the	EU	would	be	fully	protected	after	Brexit,	
the	proposed	legal	framework	does	not	live	up	to	that	expectation.		The	EU	has	
rightly	insisted	that	citizens’	rights	require	a	particular	protection,	and	the	
introduction	of	direct	effect	and	supremacy	for	these	provisions	in	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	can	be	considered	an	important	achievement,	given	in	
particular	the	UK’s	initial	refusal	and	the	unique	character	of	applying	these	
mechanisms	outside	the	EU.		At	the	same	time,	the	EU	(and	particularly	the	
European	Commission)	has	been	too	complacent	and	formalistic	in	its	approach.			
One	cannot	take	for	granted	that	by	copying	substantive	provisions	of	EU	law	
(such	as	the	Citizens’	Directive),	and	procedural	mechanisms	(such	as	direct	
effect)	into	a	country	that	is	no	longer	fully	part	of	the	EU	judicial	system,	
citizens	would	be	equally	protected	as	when	that	country	was	still	part	of	the	EU.		
The	substantive	flaw	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	that	it	fails	to	recognise	
that	applying	the	Citizens’	Directive	main	criteria	has	very	different	
consequences	when	it	is	done	with	a	declaratory	system	within	an	EU	Member	
State	than	when	it	is	applied	to	a	constitutive	system	in	a	non-EU	country	
(particularly	as	the	latter	never	applied	a	registration	system).		The	consequence	
is	that	many	EU	citizens	may	fail	to	prove	their	entitlement	and	will	
automatically	be	faced	with	the	harsh	consequences	of	the	UK’s	‘hostile	
environment’	approach	to	immigration	policy.				
The	procedural	flaw	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	the	assumption	that	by	
simply	copying	direct	effect,	EU	citizens	will	be	properly	protected,	even	when	
the	UK	is	no	longer	part	of	the	EU.		Yet,	direct	effect	is	only	one	aspect	of	the	EU’s	
judicial	framework.	In	the	absence	of	other	supranational	guarantees	such	as	the	
infringement	procedure	and	Francovich	damages,	but	equally	in	the	context	of	
doubts	about	how	the	UK	will	put	into	practice	direct	effect,	the	requirement	to	
set	out	citizens’	rights	provisions	into	primary	legislation	provides	a	welcome	
complementary	guarantee.		Unfortunately,	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	remains	
evasive	on	such	a	requirement.			
The	Withdrawal	Act	also	leaves	considerable	scope	for	important	aspects	of	EU	
citizens'	rights	provisions	to	be	implemented	via	secondary	legislation,	and	the	
Government’s	intention	to	introduce	a	voluntary	registration	scheme	prior	to	
Brexit	may	function	as	a	strong	impetus	to	pre-empt	further	parliamentary	
debate	and	guarantees	on	citizens’	rights.				
In	order	to	protect	its	citizens	properly,	the	EU	should	abandon	its	formalistic	
approach	and	take	into	account	that	the	particular	challenges	of	implementation	
in	the	UK	outside	of	the	EU	require	particular	guarantees	that	go	beyond	a	
simple	copy	and	paste	of	substantive	EU	law	norms	and	EU	procedural	
principles.		Such	guarantees	can	be	provided	by	specific	provisions	in	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	on	how	the	UK	will	implement	a	simple	registration	
system,	and	by	a	clearer	requirement	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	citizens’	
rights	provisions	should	be	set	out	in	primary	legislation.		Alternatively,	such	
guarantees	could	be	written	in	a	Protocol	to	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	in	
which	the	UK	would	set	out	in	detail	how	it	will	implement	the	Agreement.		This	
would	take	into	account	the	particular	implementation	challenges	in	the	UK,	and	
make	the	UK’s	promises	legally	binding	internationally,	without	having	to	reopen	
the	agreement	reached	on	the	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement.64		Such	a	Protocol	
could	subsequently	be	translated	into	primary	legislation,	together	with	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement.	
In	the	absence	of	further	guarantees	in	the	final	Withdrawal	Agreement	or	an	
attached	Protocol,	it	is	up	to	the	UK	Parliament	to	take	up	its	responsibility.	The	
Implementation	Bill	should	set	out	clear	guarantees	for	EU	citizens’	rights,	both	
by	ensuring	a	solid	definition	of	direct	effect	and	setting	out	rights	in	detail	in	the	
Bill	itself,	leaving	little	leeway	for	discretion	for	Government	action	to	decide	on	
the	most	fundamental	rights	to	reside,	work	and	access	to	services	for	people	
who	have	already	been	residing	in	the	country	legally	for	years.	
	
	
																																																								
64	I	have	argued	elsewhere	how	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	should	be	‘ring-fenced’	from	other	
withdrawal	negotiation	topics,	so	that	these	rights	would	be	guaranteed	even	if	the	rest	of	the	
Withdrawal	Agreement	fails,	see	S.	Smismans,	“Brexit:	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	
under	Article	50	TEU”,	available	at	Eutopialaw	blog,	16	June	2017,		
https://eutopialaw.com/2017/06/16/brexit-a-separate-citizens-rights-agreement-under-
article-50-teu/	
